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Abstract
People choose friendships with people similar to themselves, i.e. they sort by resemblence. Economic
studies have shown when sorting is optimal and constitute an equilibrium, however, this presumes lack
of beneficial spillovers. We investigate formation of economic and social networks where agents may
form or cut ties. We combine a setup with link formation where agents have types that determine the
value of a connection. We provide conditions for sorting in friendships, i.e. that agents tend to partner
only with those with those sufficiently similar to themselves. Conditions are provided with and without
beneficial spillovers from indirect connections. We show that sorting may be suboptimal, yet a socially
stable outcome, despite otherwise obeying the conditions for sorting in Becker (1973). We analyze policy
tools to mitigate suboptimal sorting. Another feature is that agents with higher value are more central in
networks under certain conditions; a side effect is sorting by degree centrality under certain conditions.
Finally we illustrate the limits to patterns of sorting and centrality.
Keywords:. assortative matching; assortativity; network formation; network externalities; one-sided match-
ing.
1. Introduction
A ubiquitous finding in studies of social relations is the tendency to form more ties with people similar
to one-self, i.e. the pattern known as sorting or homophily cf. the meta-study by McPherson et al. (2001).
Economic research has contributed to the understanding of sorting by providing mathematically sufficient
conditions for when marriage-labor markets and groups get sorted and when this is optimal. However,
no research has reconciled the framework of Becker (1973) on sorting with the literature on network
formation as pioneered by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Our investigation yields new insights on network
formation by rational agents: when is sorting stable and optimal if beneficial network externalities are
either not present or present, and; which other patterns arise in these stable networks? In addition we
demonstrate how policies may be enacted that can curb sorting when excessive, and thus provide higher
welfare. These new insights may help policymakers to optimally design schools or corporations.
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While a modest tendency to sort may be beneficial by forming smaller communities that encourage
trust and shared values, however, too much sorting can be detrimental. The problems of sorting include
slowing down the spread of information and higher inequality.1 As recent decades have seen a rise in
residential income segregation and assortative mating by education it is a great concern for policy makers
how to tackle sorting.2 The insights from our analysis can be applied to understand the the indirect
effects of sorting. For instance when dividing school cohorts by ability as is the current practice in many
countries, cf. OECD (2012).
Our framework explores a setting with agents choosing partners under three core assumptions. First,
agents are heterogeneous in type for creating value in partnerships (this is in line with research on peer
effects).3 Type may refer to productive and non-productive capabilities such as skill, social aptitude or
interests and ethnicity. Second, there are possible externalities from friends of friends as in the ’con-
nections model’ of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) which captures spillovers of ideas and favors (which
does not contain types). Third, agents choose a limited number of partners reflecting constraints of time
and effort.4 Note our framework could also model corporations or self-governing organizations forming
bilateral partnerships among themselves.
In this setting we investigate robustness of network structures in the following sense: no agents can
form and/or delete links from network and be better off when allowing for transfers of utility. Although
the literature on formation of networks under externalities is vast the share that investigates heterogeneous
agents has been limited. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) pioneered in their investigation of tension between
stability and efficiency under mutual acceptance of links. A related investigation of non-mutually ac-
cepted links was pioneered by Bala and Goyal (2000). The most relevant paper is de Marti and Zenou
(2016) which also investigates segregation in a model with complementarity and externalities.5 Another
relevant paper is Goeree et al. (2009) which explores network formation and structure when there is value
heterogeneity, i.e. some agent types make links formed more valuable.
Contributions. Below we list our contributions to the literature and discuss some applications. The results
contribute mainly to our understanding of network formation and assortative matching. Some of our
results are derived when only evaluating links that are formed between a pair of agents - this corresponds
to pairwise (Nash) equilibrium. Other results require that any coalition of agents can form links between
themselves, i.e. the strong (Nash) equilibrium.6
1Golub and Jackson (2012) show that homophily affects information diffusion. Eika et al. (2014) find empirical evidence that
increased marriage sorting have contributed to higher inequality.
2See Reardon and Bischoff (2011) on segregation and Schwartz and Mare (2005) on marriage sorting.
3Some examples of empirical papers finding this include Zimmer and Toma (2000), Sacerdote (2001), Falk and Ichino (2006).
Note that empirical estimates should be cautiously interpreted as the research on peer effects is still in an infant stage cf. Manski
(1993), Shalizi and Thomas (2011), Angrist (2014).
4Limited partners is also consistent with empirical research; Ugander et al. (2011) shows this for the entire Facebook network
and Miritello et al. (2013) in phone calls for millions of people.
5Note this paper was developed independently and without awareness of de Marti and Zenou (2016). Further discussion
below.
6To the best of our knowledge this is the first demonstration of the novel features.
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The first contribution is towards the understanding of conditions for sorting. We establish sufficient
conditions for stable networks to exhibit sorting in type. In the simple case without externalities our
Proposition 1 extend the classic work to a one-sided matching setting with many partners. In the case of
externalities we provide a characterization for the set of pairwise (Nash) stable networks: when Becker
(1973)’s complementarity hold then that set coincides with the set of perfectly sorted networks where
every agent within a given type is connected and uses its quota of links; see Theorem 1 for the case of non-
constant decay (or Theorem 2 in Appendix Appendix C for constant decay). We also show that although
these networks are stable they are not efficient when there is a small or moderate level of externalities due
to a lack of connectivity across types. This problem of sub-optimality is shown to be mitigated through
policy, see Proposition 2. Finally our Proposition 3 establishes that if the agent population is large then
sorting is the unique strongly stable outcome (i.e. the core) when Becker’s complementarity hold and that
externalities satisfy asymptotic independence in social connections.
The above generalization of sorting can be applied to investigate models of homophily in social net-
works. Moreover, we provide a clear intuition how pathological sorting can constitute an undesirable, yet,
stable configuration of a social network. The intuition is analogue to a classic public goods problem: there
is a lack in the provision of links across types. This result also can be seen as providing a generic network
structure, which is commonly observed, and that suffers from inefficiencies in network formation. Finally,
to mitigate the sorting issue we demonstrate the validity of a policy instrument that provides incentives to
link across types.
The second contribution is to bring the literature on network structure into the research on game theory
and network formation. Our focus on structure is limited to measures of network centrality for individuals.
We show that if a monotonicity condition on contribution to the value of link in type is satisfied then high
type agents are more central in all stable networks; see Propositions 4 and 6. Without externalities sorting
in degree emerges, see Proposition 5, if the conditions for sorting by type and degree centrality are met.
An application of this result is that sorting by type may be detected simply from the network structure if
there is sorting by degree.
Our final contribution is to display the limits to conditions for sorting and centrality. This is done by
showing that a network where a low type agent is excessively central can be stable, see Example 2 and
Corollary 2. When the condition for monotonic centrality is not satisfied this entails a less productive
agent could be replaced in a central position and thus everyone could be better off. This highlights an-
other fundamental network configuration which is undesirable under pairwise link formation. This can
be applied to understand how some agents can maintain their central brokering position although this is
detrimental.
Related literature. The following paragraphs compare our results with the most relevant studies among
existing work by assessing the contributions above. As there is a large body of literature the review is
limited to only the most similar and noteworthy.
The most relevant paper on sorting is de Marti and Zenou (2016) which investigates conditions for
segregation/sorting in networks with externalities but with noteworthy differences (see below). As our
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setup builds on an assortative matching framework, unlike de Marti and Zenou (2016), we can directly
compare our results with those already established. The work related to stability of sorting has a strong
tradition for two-sided matching e.g. labor and dating markets starting with Becker (1973). The research
on one-sided assortative matching, i.e. the basis for our setup, has been limited to formation of clubs
(not networks) under various technologies cf. Farrell and Scotchmer (1988), Kremer (1993), Durlauf and
Seshadri (2003), Legros and Newman (2002), Pycia (2012), Baccara and Yariv (2013). All the work
on one-sided assortative matching find conditions for sorting which is similar to type complementarity
in Becker (1973). Yet, none of these papers allow for linking between groups nor consider network
externalities which are the extensions we treat. Note that Proposition 1 can be seen as a direct extension
of the classic result by Becker (1973) for networks without externalities - our contribution is to propose a
new measure of sorting which is tractable in equilibrium.
We contribute to the knowledge on sorting under externalities by building upon de Marti and Zenou
(2016). In terms of equilibrium outcomes we remove their requirement that either one or all agents of
a given type are linked to all other agents of the same type (i.e. respectively a star or a clique). This
requirement imposes an unrealistic structure implying that an agent may possess infinitely many links
in large networks. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of pairwise (Nash) equilibria
for moderate externalities. Furthermore, we demonstrate that for large populations sorting constitutes
the unique strongly stable outcome under asymptotic independence of externalities. Thus we advance
their results on sorting by making them apply more widely by allowing for variation in structures of the
subnetworks and for multiple types of agents (see details accompanying each result) while keeping the
number of links bounded for each agent. The divergence in results from de Marti and Zenou (2016)
are driven by their choice of modeling complementarity as endogenous while ours is exogenous.7 Other
essential differences are: we employ convex costs where they use linear, and; we use pairwise Nash
stability which is stricter than their pairwise stability as it allows for substitution of partners.
Research on suboptimal networks under externalities has a long tradition (cf. Koopmans and Beck-
mann (1957); Katz and Shapiro (1985); Farrell and Saloner (1986); Jackson and Wolinsky (1996); Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996);8 Bloch and Jackson (2007)). Among these generic analyses of inefficient networks
Bloch and Jackson (2007) employs the most similar setup. Bloch and Jackson (2007) use a setup without
type complementarities but also employ a framework if network formation where transfers can be ex-
tended even to agents with whom they are not linked. Unlike the above papers our main contribution for
inefficient networks is not to provide any new generic insights on suboptimal network formation; instead
we show two new classes of inefficient networks. The first class of inefficient networks suffers from an
excessive level of sorting captured by Theorems 1 and 2 (see last paragraph for second class). de Marti
and Zenou (2016) also investigates sorting which is suboptimal despite being stable - thus this part of their
analysis is subject to the same critique as their results on sorting (see above). Moreover, their result on
7The endogenous complementarity of de Marti and Zenou (2016) implies that sorting may be self-reinforcing as the incentive
to sort increases in other agents tendency to sort.
8Note our concept of pairwise stability differs from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) - see Section 2 (the model).
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inefficiency only holds when there are a handful of agents of each type (see discussion accompanying The-
orem 1 for details). On the contrary, our result on inefficient sorting holds for any number of agents and
only requires a connected subnetwork within a given type - this reveals that the scope of the underlying
problem is much wider. Another, perhaps more profound difference, is that the source of inefficiency in
their setting is different: their endogenous incentive to sorting implies that the penalty from linking across
types is removed when no agents sort (i.e. sort negatively) - thus there are always beneficial spillovers
from connecting across types. Thus inefficiency is due to a lack of coordination rather than misaligned
incentives.
Our results on centrality relate to work within economics and network science. The only relevant
economic research related to the relationship between type and centrality is Goeree et al. (2009). They
show in two examples a star network with a high value agent in center is efficient and Nash stable. Note
their analysis is under one-way formation of links (only one side accepts) and their examples are not
generalized beyond those for few agents. In their experiments the efficient network emerges more often
and the frequency increases with repetitions.
The work that relates most to sorting in degree are Currarini et al. (2009, 2016); Iijima and Kamada
which also model strategic agents, however, without externalities. One big difference is that degree sorting
their models are different and all driven by composition of types rather than preferences/complementary
which is the source in this setup. There are several non-economic models in statistical physics which
predict sorting in degree, yet, these have no strategic considerations. The most prominent is preferential
attachment, see Barabasi and Albert (1999). Note that an analogy to our pattern of degree sorting is found
in Kremer (1993) and Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) where more productive groups can sustain a larger
scale of organizations.
Our results on the limits of sorting indicate that an agent can amass so much network capital that the
agent becomes the most central despite not being the best candidate. In these networks there is a failure
of sorting and monotonic centrality. The work on network externalities in two-sided settings by Katz and
Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1986) find an analogous pattern. In their setups the source to
inefficiency is that a suboptimal producer is supplying the consumers who cannot coordinate on choosing
the better producer and get ”locked-in”.
Paper organization. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model; Section
3 investigates sorting and its potential sub-optimality; Section 4 analyzes the network structure implied by
the model; Section 5 rounds up the analysis by outlining the limits to sorting and network structure, and;
Section 6 concludes in a discussion of assumptions. All proofs are found along in Appendix Appendix B.
2. Model
Let N = {1, ..,n} constitute a set of agents. Each agent i∈N is endowed a fixed measure of type, xi ∈X
where X ⊂R is the set of realized levels of types for agents in N. Let x¯=maxX and
¯
x=minX . Let agents’
type be sorted descending in their label and letX = (x1,x2, ...,xn) where xl ≥ xl+1 for l = 1, ..,n−1.
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Linking and networks. Two agents i, j ∈ N may link if mutually accepted; a link may be broken by both
agents. A link between i and j is denoted i j ∈ µ where the set µ consists of links and is called a network.
The set of all networks is denoted M = {µ|µ ⊆ µc} where µc is the complete network (all agents are
linked).
A coalition of agents is a group t ⊆ N such that t ∈ T where T is the superset of N excluding the
empty set. For a given group t define X (t) as the vector of types ordered descending for agents in t. A
coalitional move is a set of actions implemented by a coalition that moves the network from one state to
another. A move from µ to µ˜ is feasible for coalition t if: added links, µ˜\µ are formed only between
members of coalition t; deleted links, µ\µ˜ must include a member of coalition t.
Network measures. The neighborhood, ν , is the set agents whom an agent links to: νi(µ) = { j ∈ N : i j ∈
µ}. The number of neighbors is a measure of centrality called degree and denoted ki(·) for i. A path is a
subset of links {i1i2, i2i3, ..., il−1il} ⊆ µ where no agent is reached more than once. The distance between
two agents i, j in a network is the length of the shortest path between them - this is denoted pi j : M→ N0.
When no path exist then distance is infinite.
Utility. The utility accruing to agent i is denoted ui. An agent’s utility equals benefits less costs, expressed
mathematically as ui = bi− ci. The aggregate utility is denoted U(·).
We use two approaches for modeling costs: a quota of links which is employed in Section 3 on sorting
or the more general used in Section 4 on centrality. The degree quota, κ , is the maximum number of links
for any agent: for i ∈ N it holds ki(·) ≤ κ . The quota implies an opportunity cost of linking. If a degree
quota is employed then no linking surplus means all agent has a degree equal to the degree quota, i.e.
∀i ∈ N : ki = κ . A type x ∈ X is self-sufficient if nx > κ .
Benefits to agent i is a weighted sum consisting of two elements; network and individual value:
bi(µ) = Σ j 6=iwi j(µ) · zi j (1)
The network factor, wi j(µ) is a function of network distance. The individual link value is zi j which
measures the personal value to i of linking to j - the value is a function of the two partners’ type zi j =
z(xi,x j). The function z is assumed twice differentiable as well as taking positive and bounded values.9
Let the (total) link value be defined as the value of linking for the pair, i.e. Zi j = zi j + z ji.10 The two
components, network and linking value, are further restricted in the subsequent sections depending on
their usage.
The game framework. This paper explores a static setting of one period. Agents’ information about
payoffs of other agents is complete. Together the players, action, utility and information constitutes a
game we will now outline the stability concept for.
9The upper bound rules out an infinite number of links in equilibrium.
10Note most results use only the total link value. However, the results in Section 5 rely on decomposability of total link value
into individual link value.
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Any pair of agents can transfer ’utility’ between them. Let a net-transfer from agent j to agent i
be denoted as τi j ∈ R such that τi j = −τ ji which implies non-wastefulness of utility. The matrix of net
transfers is denoted τ . For each agent i its net-payoff is defined as si = ui(µ)+Στi j. In addition it is
assumed that the net-transfer between two agents with a link can only be changed if this is mutually
agreed or the link is broken.
Stability. We define network stability using the concept of coalitional moves. A coalition t is blocking a
network µ with net-transfers τ if there is a feasible coalitional move from network µ to network µ˜ with τ˜
where all members in t have higher net-payoff after the move.
We employ two concepts of stability. The first is strong stability: this is satisfied for a network if
there exist transfers such that no coalition (of any size) may have a feasible move which is profitable for
all its members. The second concept, pairwise (Nash) stability,11 is similar but has weaker requirements:
it holds when there exist transfers such that no coalitions of at most two agents may block. The sets of
stable networks are denoted respectively Ms−stb and Mp−stb. A discussion of the stability concepts and its
relation to the literature is found in Section 6.
Our pairwise definition of stability is stricter than that of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). However, the
stricter requirement is to allow for substitution of links (simultaneous deletion and formation) which is a
standard requirement in the matching literature.12
A noteworthy feature is that strongly stability implies pairwise stability; thus any condition valid for
pairwise stability also applies to strong stability. In addition without network externalities every pairwise
stable network is also strongly stable, see Lemma 1. Note also that any strongly stable network requires
efficiency (coalition of all agents can implement any network). Thus we can employ efficiency to derive
structure in strongly stable networks.
3. Sorting in type
This section investigates stratification in type, i.e. based on the agents’ exogenous types. In this
section we employ the degree quota. Recall that no linking surplus means that any agent i must use all
possible links, i.e. ki = κ . The no linking surplus will be a requirement in most equilibria in this section.
In order to derive results a restriction of payoffs is necessary. Recall the total link value is the sum of
individual link for the two partners in the pair. The essential feature of the total link value for sorting is
complementarity in type. Becker (1973) shows that type complementarity holds when:
Definition 1. The link value has supermodularity if ∂
2
∂x∂y Z(x,y)> 0 - this entails:
Z(x, x˜)+Z(y, y˜)> Z(x,y)+Z(x˜, y˜), x > y˜, x˜ > y. (2)
11This also known as bilateral stability, cf. Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007)
12For instance, pairwise stability coupled with and Becker (1973)’s condition for sorting, i.e. supermodularity, would not
imply that sorting be the unique pairwise stable outcome in the marriage market as in Becker (1973).
7
The concept of sorting that we employ is a generalization of the sorting when there is a single partner
such as Becker’s marriage market. The shape of sorting is such that a high type agent has partners which
weakly dominate in type when compared partner-by-partner with the partners of a lower type agent. Note
the comparison is done over the sorted set of partners type X . The sorting pattern is mathematically
defined as:
Definition 2. Sorting in type holds in µ if for all pair i, j such that xi > x j it holds that:
X (νi(µ)/{ j})l ≥X (ν j(µ)/{i})l+l∗ , ∀l ∈ {1, ..,k∗},
where k∗ = min(ki(µ),k j(µ)) and l∗ = max(k j(µ)− ki(µ),0).
Definition 3. A network µ is perfect sorted (in type) if xi = x j for any i j ∈ µ . Denote the set of perfectly
sorted networks as Mp−srt .
3.1. No externalities
We begin with the setting where network externalities are absent and thus indirect connections are
irrelevant. Our first result is that sorting in type emerges under similar conditions as in Becker (1973)
when network externalities are absent:
Proposition 1. If there is supermodularity and no externalities then for any pairwise stable network there
is sorting in type.
In the following subsections we extent results to a setting with externalities. Note that the presence of
externalities may imply sorting is not always equilibrium outcome - see Example 2 and Corollary 2.
3.2. Externalities
We proceed to a more general context where indirect connections matter for utility. Whenever we
allow for externalities we restrict our attention to forms of linking utility.
wi j(µ) =
δ pi j(µ)−1, constant decay,1=1(pi j(µ))+δ ·1∈(1,∈ f ty)(pi j(µ)), hyperbolic decay, (3)
where 1∈(1,∈ f ty)(l) is the Dirac measure/indicator function of whether 1 < l <∈ f ty.
The first and more general setting is where utility from connections decays over increasing distance
at a constant exponential rate - this corresponds to benefits from linking in the ’connections-model’ from
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The other case is when externalities from indirect connections are dis-
counted equally at any distance if there is a connection, i.e. a finite path length. This second case is
referred to as hyperbolic decay and entails that there is no decay beyond that from distance one (linked)
to distance two.
In the remainder of this section we employ hyperbolic decay when analyzing inefficient sorting as it
provides for more intuitive and immediate results without restrictions on the network. As noted earlier, a
more general exposition is found in Supplementary Appendix Appendix C.
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(A): Segregated network, µ . Pairwise
stable if δ ≤ δ¯ (Zˆ).
(B): Pairwise move by agent 1, 6 who
form a link together and remove one
each.
(C): Connected network, µ˜ . Efficient
if δ ≥
¯
δ (Zˆ).
Figure 1: Sorted network is stable but inefficient. The above three networks depict Example 1. The network in (A) is pairwise
(Nash) stable for some parameters and the network in (B) is the only kind of feasible deviation. The network in (C) is an efficient
network.
Finite population. In the following paragraphs we reexamine our results on sorting by illustrating a class
of sorted networks that are suboptimal when introducing network externalities. The sub-optimality holds
despite fulfilling supermodularity. We begin here by exhibiting a simple example where the problem
emerge.
Excessive sorting refers to a network with perfect sorting according to type where the segregated
groups could collectively benefit from connecting. However, they fail to connect as incentives do not in-
ternalize externalities under pairwise network formation. The relevant set of networks are those networks
which are perfectly sorted but within each type all agents are connected. Let networks which are perfectly
sorted and connected among each type be denoted:
Mp−srt:conn = {µ ∈Mp−srt |∀i, j ∈ N,xi = x j : pi j(µ)<∈ f ty}
The aim is to show there exist an open region of thresholds (
¯
δ , δ¯ ) such that if the level of externalities
is within the region then any network in Mp−srt:conn where there is no degree surplus is pairwise (Nash)
stable for some transfers τ but inefficient. An introduction to this problem is found in Example 1 below in
a stylized, simple manner. The example is graphically represented in Figure 1.
Example 1. There are six agents; three of high type (1,2,3) and three of low type (4,5,6). Moreover, there
is supermodularity, degree quota of two (κ=2) and constant decay. Define two networks: a network with
perfect sorting, µ = {12,13,23,45,46,56}, see Figure 1.A; a network which is bridged of µ , defined as
µ˜ = {12,23,34,45,56,61}, see Figure 1.C. We show in this example that for a range of decay-factors that
µ is pairwise stable yet suboptimal.
In this setup there is a unique move which is both feasible and payoff relevant.13 This move consists
of forming a link across types when both delete a link. Such a move could be agents 1,6 forming a link
13Under pairwise stability at most one link can be formed in a single move. Without transfers all formed links have value and
thus deletion of a link always leads to a loss. Thus only coalitional moves where new links are formed can be valuable. For
network µ all links to same types are already formed. Thus only forming a link with the other types.
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while deleting links to 3 and 4 which we denote µˆ = µ ∪{16}\{13,46} and seen as Figure 1.B. Benefits
for agents 1 and 6 from network µ and deviating from it are:
u1(µˆ)+u6(µˆ) = (1+δ ) · [z(x¯, x¯)+ z(¯x, ¯x)]+ [1+2δ ] · [z(x¯, ¯x)+ z(¯x, x¯)],
= (1+δ ) · 12 · [Z(x¯, x¯)+Z(¯x, ¯x)]+ [1+2δ ] ·Z(x¯, ¯x),
u1(µ)+u6(µ) = 2 · [z(x¯, x¯)+ z(¯x, ¯x)] = Z(x¯, x¯)+Z(¯x, ¯x).
The condition for deviating to µˆ not being pairwise profitable is u1(µ)+u6(µ)> u1(µˆ)+u6(µˆ); this
is sufficient for pairwise stability due to payoff symmetry in µ and no transfers.
We now turn to deriving condition for when segregating is inefficient. The aggregate benefits over all
agents of the two networks µ and µ˜ is expressed below in the two equations.
U(µ˜) = (2+δ ) · [Z(x¯, x¯)+Z(
¯
x,
¯
x)]+ [2+7δ ] ·Z(x¯,
¯
x),
U(µ) = 3 · [Z(x¯, x¯)+Z(
¯
x,
¯
x)].
Sorting is inefficient when: U(µ) < U(µ˜). The two inequalities governing pairwise stability and
inefficiency has the following positive solution:
¯
δ (Zˆ) = Zˆ
Zˆ+52
,
δ¯ (Zˆ) = Zˆ
Zˆ+1
,
Zˆ = Z(x¯,x¯)+Z(¯x,¯x)2Z(x¯,
¯
x) −1,
where
¯
δ and δ¯ are thresholds for respectively when network µ becomes inefficient and unstable when δ
increases.
The example above demonstrates that sorting can be inefficient when there are network effects despite
presence of supermodularity. The inefficiency stems from a novel source - the pairwise formation of links.
The intuition is that under pairwise deviation the two agents do not internalize the total value created for
other agents number of indirect links between a high and a low agent. Note that the above example has a
very close correspondence to Propositions 1.ii and 4.iii in de Marti and Zenou (2016) - the only addition
of their setup to our example is that they allow for a variation in the number of agents for each type.
We proceed with a generalization of the example above which holds for various structures of the
subnetworks within types and for multiple types. As we proceed with our generalization we introduce two
new concepts to convey the results.
Let the subset of agents who a link in µ be denoted N(µ) = {i ∈ N : ∃ j s.t. i j ∈ µ}. A component, µ˜
of network µ is a subnetwork (i.e. µ˜ ⊆ µ) where for any agent i ∈ N(µ˜) it holds that: agent i is connected
in µ˜ to all other agents j ∈ N(µ˜), and; for all j ∈ N if i j ∈ µ then i j ∈ µ˜ . A perfectly sorted network is
locally connected if there is one component for each type; the set of networks which are perfect sorted
and locally connected is denoted Mp−srt:conn.
Our next result is to extend the above example to a general class of sorted networks, denoted by the
set Mˆ. The set of network Mˆ is formed by networks where is only links to same-type agents, all agents
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use the full quota of available links and all agents of same type are connected.
Theorem 1. Suppose there is supermodularity, hyperbolic decay, more than one partner is allowed and
type self-sufficiency then:
(i) any network in Mˆ is inefficient when δ >
¯
δ , i.e. (Mˆ∩MmaxUδ>
¯
δ ) = /0;
(ii) any network in Mˆ is pairwise stable when δ ≤ δ¯ , i.e. Mˆ ⊆Mp−stbδ≤δ¯ ;
(iii) if |X |= 2 then a network is in Mˆ iff. it is pairwise stable, i.e. Mˆ = Mp−stbδ∈(0,δ¯ )
(iv) the set of networks Mˆ is non-empty when all agent type has even number greater than the degree
quota, i.e. Mˆ 6= /0 if for all x ∈ X : (κ ·nx) ∈ 2N.
where Mˆ = Mp−srt:conn∩Mno−slack and threshold bounds
¯
δ , δ¯ are defined as:
¯
δ ≤ min
x,x˜∈X
(
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜+ 12 nxnx˜
)
, Zˆx,x˜ =
Z(x,x)+Z(x˜,x˜)
2Z(x,x˜) −1
δ¯ ≥ min
x,x˜∈X
(
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜+max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜|·zˆx,x˜
)
, zˆx,x˜ =
z(argminx,x˜ nx, argmaxx,x˜ nx)
Z(x, x˜)
.
The theorem above is applicable to numerous settings where social networks are formed. If or exam-
ple schools or firms pre-sort individuals according to talent or otherwise this may lead to a sorted network
which is stable but suboptimal. A specific example could be a school where sorting by academic per-
formance type is common in many countries and is often known as tracking. In such cases the sorting
induced by the institution could lead to a stable network with no linking across despite links across having
potential to raise welfare.
An alternative version of the above theorem under constant decay can be found in Appendix Ap-
pendix C in Theorem 2. For both Theorems 1 and 2 one can view the conditions for stability of sorting
as generalizing not only Example 1 but also Propositions 1.ii and 4.iii from de Marti and Zenou (2016).
These special cases of sorting correspond to a situation with two types and all agents of a given type
link with one another, i.e. when nx¯ = n
¯
x = κ + 1 and |X | = 2. The other part of the two theorems is on
inefficiency of sorting and generalizes Example 1 and Proposition 6 from de Marti and Zenou (2016). It
advances their proposition by removing the restriction to two types and linking between all same type
agents as well as doing away with the limitation of having very few agents. For instance, if there is an
equal number of agents for each type then Proposition 6 in de Marti and Zenou (2016) is valid only for
five or less agents of each type (ten agents in total).
A visualization of how the thresholds of externalities depend on population size and strength of com-
plementarity is found in Figure 2. The upper part of the figure keeps the population size fixed while lower
ones keep the complementarity strength fixed. In the upper part it is evident that the connection thresholds
both approximately follow power-laws in the number of agents.
The remainder of this subsection will sketch a policy intervention that can mitigate the problem of
suboptimal sorting by improving welfare through encouraging connection. These interventions can be
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seen more generally as a design problem where the policy maker intervenes to induce a network that
produces higher welfare. The tool that the policy maker employs is providing incentives to agents for
forming specific links. Define a link-contingent contract as a non-negative transfer Ci j to i for linking
with another agent j. Denote the vector of link-contingent contract as C .
Definition 4. Let a network µ˜ be implementable from µ,τ given C if there exist a sequence of tuples
(µ0,τ0), ..,(µl,τl) where µ0 = µ , µl = µ˜ and τl = τ such that: for q = 1, .., l from µq−1 to µq is a feasible
pairwise move which increases the pair’s net-utility most given C , and; µ˜ is pairwise stable given τq and
C .
Proposition 2. Suppose that conditions for suboptimal sorting from Theorem 1 are valid and there are
two types then a policy maker can implement a welfare improving network when δ ∈ (
¯
δ , δ¯ ) from a sorted
network µ ∈ Mˆ.
Note that the individual compensation for paid to agents for connecting to others may not be equal. In
particular the pay may also depend on the types. This is the case when there is both supermodularity and
monotonicity in Z then agents may receive compensation increasing their type. This would be the case
in a sorted suboptimal network with no transfers where components have same number of agents and are
isomorphic to another.
Large population. We finalize this section by investigating what pattern of linking is exhibited when the
set of agents becomes asymptotic infinite. In this large matching market we examine asymptotic perfect
sorting, i.e. when measured share of links to same type agents converges to one:
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Figure 2: Thresholds for connecting. Visualization of thresholds for connecting from Theorem 1. The upper part varying sizes
of populations and fixed strength of complementarity. The lower part has has varying strength of complementarity and fixed
populations size. It is assumed there are two types with an equal number of agents.
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Definition 5. Let asymptotic perfect sorting hold for a sequence of networks sets M˜n if for any network
µ ∈ M˜n where n→∈ f ty it holds that |{i j ∈ µ : xi = x j}|/|µ| ' 1.
Define asymptotic independence as δ < (κ − 1)−1. For large matching markets the sufficient condi-
tions for asymptotic perfect sorting to emerge in strongly stable networks are:
Proposition 3. If there is supermodularity, a degree quota and constant decay with asymptotic indepen-
dence then there is asymptotic perfect sorting for strongly stable networks.
The result above demonstrates that the availability of many agents for linking induces perfect sorting in
strongly stable networks. This is the same prediction as the conclusion of Becker (1973) for the marriage
market model but holds in the presence of externalities with constant decay. Note that the result relies on
efficiency requiring perfect sorting and using this to infer properties of strong stability. However, we may
interpret it differently, there is no loss of sorting when there are many agents.
4. Network structure
In this section we examine the structure of stable networks when measured by specific measures of
network centrality such as the degree (i.e. number of links). In order to make progress in this question
it is necessary to change restrictions on utility. The most important new restriction in this context is on
the value of linking where monotonicity in type is assumed; that is, a higher typesproduce higher total
value when fixing the type of the partner. Although this new restriction may seem ad hoc it has a natural
correspondence with circumstances where some agent types always increase value of the linking compared
to others e.g. by being more capable or have better social skills.
Definition 6. The link value has monotonicity if ∂∂x Z(x,y)> 0.
In contrast with the previous section here we model costs with an explicit cost function. The cost
function for each agent is c : N0→ R which is positive, strictly increasing and strictly convex in degree
(i.e. number of links), ki.
4.1. No externalities
We begin with a setting where there are no externalities. The relevant measure of centrality without
externalities are agents’ number of links, i.e. degree. This measure is commonly used in applied in
research on networks.
We start with the following question: what is the relation between network measures of centrality and
type? The short answer is that type and connectivity go hand in hand: higher type implies (weakly) higher
centrality. We call this degree monotonicity:
Definition 7. A set of networks M has degree monotonicity in type if:
∀µ ∈M : xi > x j⇒ ki(µ)≥ k j(µ).
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Proposition 4. Suppose there are no externalities and monotonicity in link value then the set of pairwise
stable networks has degree monotonicity.
The intuition behind the above result is that the marginal benefits for forming an additional link is
strictly increasing in type when the link value is monotonic. Thus an agent with higher type has an
increased incentive to form links jointly with other agents.
We turn to investigating whether or not more gregarious agents (agents with many partners), tend to
associate with agents who are as gregarious as themselves? That is, is there sorting in degree. The simple
answer is yes, under certain circumstances as elaborated below.
We build our intuition on two established results: firstly, there is a positive relationship between higher
talent and (weakly) more partners (Proposition 4), and; secondly, partners are chosen assortative in talent
(Proposition 1). By combining these two claims it can be shown there will also be degree assortativity.
Although the intuition of combining the two previous results is straightforward additional structure needs
to be imposed to show the result. Let complete heterogeneity be satisfied if for every agent has a unique
level of talent, i.e. n = |X |.
Our concept of degree sorting is defined analogously to sorting in type. That is, every agent with
strictly higher degree must have partners which weakly dominate in degree when compared partner-by-
partner with the partners of agent with lower degree:
Definition 8. A network µ has sorting in degree when:
∀i, j ∈ N,ki(µ)> k j(µ) : K (νi(µ)/{ j})l ≥K (ν j(µ)/{i})l, l = 1, ...,k j(µ),
whereK (t) as the vector of degrees for agents in coalition t ordered descending.
Proposition 5. If there are supermodularity, monotonicity in link value as well as complete heterogeneity
but no externalities then every pairwise stable network has sorting in degree.
The above result is identical to Proposition 1 with the exception that the assortative property in this
result is degree and this result has an added requirement. The emergence of this assortative pattern is
not only a theoretical curiosity - this pattern is an underlying property observed across various empirical
social networks, see the literature review.
The feature emerging in Proposition 5 is also known as degree assortativity is relevant as unlike Cur-
rarini et al. (2009)
When we move to a setting of externalities our pattern of sorting by degree does not hold in general.
The reason is that either sorting by talent or monotonic degree may fail. This is captured by the follows
from Corollary 1 in the next section as it shows both sorting in type and monotonic centrality may fail.
4.2. Externalities
We proceed by exploring the case of network externalities. We limit the examination to the relation
between type and centrality, not neighbors’ centrality.
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We generalize the pattern of monotonic centrality in talent. However, in order to gain generality the
restrictions on the link value Z(·) and a stricter equilibrium concept. We define monotonicity of δ -decay
centrality by replacing the measure in the definition of degree monotonicity. Also define no modularity
when ∂
2
∂x∂y Z(x,y) = 0.
Proposition 6. Suppose there are externalities as well as monotonicity and no modularity then the set of
strongly stable networks has δ -decay monotonicity.
The result above emerges from the fact that there are only monotone and independent effects of more
talent (due to the absence of modularity). The independence of effects entails that the link value can
be split into a part for each partner, Z(x, x˜) = Zˆ(x)+ Zˆ(x˜). It is possible to show that a given agent i’s
total contributions to the network is the product between Zˆ(xi) and the sum of network weights. Under
these circumstances monotonicity implies that more talented agents must have higher measure of network
weights or else efficiency implied by strong stability is violated.
We conclude our analysis of monotonic centrality by pointing to the limitations of our results. When
no modularity is violated for instance then Proposition 6 may not hold, see Example 3 found in Appendix
Appendix B.5. Likewise by relaxing strong stability in Proposition 6 to pairwise stability it follows that
monotonic centrality also fails. This is seen from Example 2 and Corollary 1 in the next section.
5. Limits to sorting and centrality monotonicity
The previous two sections derive patterns for sorting and network centrality which we readdress here.
We show the failure of those patterns is possible despite fulfilling some of the conditions that are sufficient
in the previous sections: monotone and supermodular link value. We focus on a generic network where
the agent with least type is in the center:
Definition 9. A star, µ , is a network where some agent called the center of µ and each other agent has
only one single link is this a link to the center.
Definition 10. A star is low value sponsored when its center has the minimal type.
When there is monotonicity a low value sponsored star lacks efficiency. The lack of inefficiency stems
from the fact that under monotonicity substituting a high-value agent to become the center will increase
the value of the network. The following example demonstrates that the low value sponsored star can be
stable under monotonicity and thus also inefficient:
Example 2. Let there be three agents where agents 1,2 are high types while agent 3 is low type. Suppose
additionally there is weak supermodularity, strict monotonicity and and convex costs. Moreover network
externalities have either constant or hyperbolic decay.
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Let network µ be the low value sponsored star, i.e. µ = {13,23}. Network µ is inefficient as µ˜ =
{12,13} provides strictly higher aggregate utility as for δ ∈ [0,1):
U(µ˜) > U(µ),
Z(x¯, x¯)+(1+δ ) ·Z(x¯,
¯
x) > δ ·Z(x¯, x¯)+2Z(x¯,
¯
x),
(1−δ ) ·Z(x¯, x¯) > (1−δ ) ·Z(x¯,
¯
x).
We show that µ is pairwise stable for certain transfers. We begin with conditions for when deviating
is unprofitable when only are deleted links (no links formed). Cutting all links corresponds to an outside
option with net-utility of zero - this is Inequality 4. Another option is agent 3 deleting one link and getting
net value of the remaining link - see Inequality 5:
si(µ,τ) ≥ 0, i ∈ N, (4)
τ3i ≥ c(2)− c(1)− z(¯x, x¯), i ∈ {2,3}. (5)
It remains to be shown the condition that prevent any pairwise deviation by forming a link. Only agent
1,2 can form a link. There are three options for forming link 12: deleting no links, deleting one link or
deleting all - captured by respectively Inequality 6, 7 and 8:
2 · [c(3)− c(2)] ≥ (1−δ ) ·Z(x¯, x¯), (6)
s1(µ,τ)+ s2(µ,τ) ≥ Z(x¯, x¯)+ z(x¯, ¯x) · (1+δ )− c(1)− c(2)+max{τ13,τ23}, (7)
si(µ,τ)+ s j(µ,τ) ≥ Zi j−2 · c(1), i 6= j. (8)
We conclude the example by indicating when the above conditions are satisfied. From Lemma 3 in
Appendix Appendix B.5 the sufficient conditions for Inequality (4)-(8) to be satisfied are, linear costs (c˜ of
forming a link) and δ being sufficiently large as well as,
2 ·Z(x¯,
¯
x)+Z(x¯, x¯)≥ 4c˜ and Z(x¯,
¯
x)> c˜.
3
1 2
Figure 3: Limits to monototonic centrality. The above network depicts the limits of sorting and monotonic centrality from
Example 2. The low value agent (i=3) is excessively central which is inefficient. Moreover there is insufficient sorting as the
high value agents (i=1,2) are not linked.
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The reason why the low value sponsored star is stable in Example 2 is that agents fail to coordinate
on displacing the low value agent with a high value agent as center. The failure arises despite having the
potential to make everyone better off.
The intuition from Example 2 can extended to a more general result - low value sponsored stars may
be stable even for many agents. This failure is expressed in the following result:14
Corollary 1. If there are externalities, monotonicity, supermodularity and a cost function then the low
value sponsored star is inefficient and can be pairwise stable.
The above result can be seen as an analogy to the results Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and
Shapiro (1985). In their work on markets of consumers and sellers under consumer externalities a loss
productive company may become the main supplier despite this being inefficient. This is similar to this
result, the agents are locked in to an inefficient star despite this being inefficient. This can be applied to
understand how decentralized organizations may fail to promote the best candidate to become the leader
but rather choose the incumbent.
As alluded to previously the above corollary can also be interpreted in terms of its implications for
networks:
Corollary 2. When there are externalities then under pairwise stability: sorting in type may fail; mono-
tonic degree centrality and δ -decay centrality may fail.
The corollary above demonstrates that despite meeting the conditions of Becker (1973) these condi-
tions are not sufficient for sorting in social networks with externalities.
6. Concluding discussion
Our analysis is based on strict assumptions which we discuss in this final section. We avoid discussing
sorting under search as there is a large literature e.g. Shimer and Smith (2000).
One severe caveat with our analysis, and stable networks in general, is that these networks may not
exist. The classic example is the room-mate problem, cf. Gale and Shapley (1962). Furthermore, the
gross substitutes conditions from Kelso and Crawford (1982) which ensures existence of stable matchings
in related settings are not satisfied in our setting with externalities.15 Neverthless, the scope in lack of
existence may not be excessive. We can derive the cost of stability (the necessary payments to induce
stability) from Bachrach et al. (2009).
There is also a number of restrictive assumptions on payoff. The most crucial assumption are payoff
separability and fixed structure of externalities. However, the results should be robust, for instance to
introduction of utility from triads etc. which is common in the economic literature on networks. Another
critical assumptions is supermodularity and monotonicity along with perfect transferability. Nevertheless,
14 The proof follows from the auxiliary results in Lemma 4 and 5 from Appendix Appendix B.5.
15The lack of gross substitutes is due to the fact that a change in one active link can imply a change the value of other links.
This fact will violate gross substitutes.
17
as mentioned in the introduction, these two assumptions can be replaced by monotonicity in individual link
value and perfect non-transferability, which is also in line with some research on peer effects.16 Finally
although our model did not include a measure of effort this can incorporated by rewriting the setup as in
Baccara and Yariv (2013).
Finally it is important to note that the derivation of Proposition 3 and 6 rely on efficiency being
a necessary condition for strong stability to hold. Although efficiency is a unique property for strong
stability (and does not hold for weaker concepts) then strong stability should be seen as a refinement with
desirable properties which makes it more likely when it exists.17
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Appendix A. Auxiliary results
Lemma 1. In the absence of network externalities then the set of strongly stable networks is equivalent to
the set of pairwise stable networks, i.e., Mp−stbδ=0 = M
s−stb
δ=0 .
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Proof. By definition it holds that Mp−stbδ=0 ⊆Mp−stbδ=0 , thus we need to show that Mp−stbδ=0 ⊆Mp−stbδ=0 to prove
the claim. This claim is shown using similar to arguments to Klaus and Walzl (2009)’s Theorem 3.i.
Let µ with associated contracts τ be a network which is blocked by a coalition. It will be shown that for
every coalition t ∈ T that blocks, within the coalition there is a subset of no more than two members that
also wishes to block the network. Let µ˜ be the alternative network that the blocking coalitions implements
through a feasible coalition move and τ be the transfers associated with µ˜ .
It is always possible to partition the set of deleted links µ\µ˜ into two: (i) a subset denoted µˆ where
for each link i j that can be deleted where one of the two partners can benefit, i.e. it holds that either
zi j + τi j− [ci(µ)− ci(µ\i j)] < 0 or z ji + τ ji− [c j(µ)− ci(µ\i j)] < 0; (ii) a subset denoted µ˘ where for
each link i j neither of the previous two inequalities are satisfied.
Suppose that the first partition is non-empty, i.e. µˆ 6= /0. However, as deleting links can be done by a
single agent on its own then the move only takes needs the coalition of that agent to delete the link. Thus
any part of a coalitional move that only involves profitably removing links can be performed in parts by a
coalition with a single agent - therefore this move is also a pairwise block.
Thus it remains to be shown that the remaining part of coalitional move also can be performed as a
pairwise block, i.e. when forming µ˜\µ and deleting µ˘ . This part of the coalitional move must entail
forming links as no links can be deleted profitably. The set of formed links µ˜\µ can be partitioned into
a number of |µ˜\µ| feasible submoves of adding a single link while deleting links by each of the agents
i and j who form a link. The feasibility for each of the partitioned moves is always true when there is a
cost function as moves are unrestricted. It is now argued that each of the partitioned moves are feasible
when there is a degree quota. If the network µ ∪ i j is feasible then the move of simply adding the link is
feasible. If µ ∪ i j is not feasible, then agents i and j can delete at most one link each and if both µ and µ˜
are feasible then this also feasible as the degree quota is kept.
For the coalitional move to µ˜ it must be that at least at least one link among the implemented links
µ˜\µ has a strictly positive value that exceeds the loss from deleting at most one link for each of two agents
forming the link. This follows as it is known that deleting one or more links cannot add any value and
thus must have weakly negative value and that by definition the total value to the blocking coalition must
be positive. As every one of the partitioned moves is feasible, it follows that for every coalitional move
there are two agents who can form link while potentially destroying current links and both be better off.
In other words, for every coalition that blocks, there is a pairwise coalition that blocks.
Fact 1. For every κ,n such that n > κ and n ·κ is even there exists a network µn,κ where all agents have
exactly κ neighbors. Moreover, if κ ≥ 2 then µn,κ is connected.
Proof. Suppose n is even. Let % be the modulus operator. We can construct the following networks.
µˆn,κ =
{
i j : i ∈ {1, ..., n2}, j ∈ {(n2 + i% n2), ...,(n2 +[i+κ−1] % n2})
}
, κ ≤ n2 ,
µ˜n,κ =
µˆn,κ , κ ≤ n2 ,µc\µˆn,n−κ−1, κ > n2 .
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Letting µn,κ = µ˜n,κ is sufficient for n is even. When n is odd we know that κ is even and thus we can
use the following amended procedure instead:
ιn,κ(ι) =
n−12 + ι , κ ≤ n−12n−1
2 +(ι+κ)%
n−1
2 , κ >
n−1
2
µn,κ = µ˜n−1,κ\
{
i j : i ∈ {1, .., κ2 }, j = ιn,κ(i)
}∪{i j : i = n, j ∈ (∪ι{1,..,κ2 }{ι , ιn,κ(ι)})}
We now show that if κ ≥ 2 it follows that µ˜n,κ is connected. Assume that n is even and suppose κ ≤ n2 ;
for any i ∈ N : i < n2 where i′ = i+1 and let j = n2 + i+1 where i j, i′ j ∈ µ˜n,κ ; thus for all i, i′ ∈ {1, .., n2}
it holds that pii′(µ˜n,κ) <∈ f ty. In addition, as for any i ∈ N : i ≤ n2 , j = n2 + i it holds that i j ∈ µ˜n,κ it
follows that µ˜n,κ is connected. If instead κ > n2 then by construction ii
′ ∈ µ˜n,κ if either max(i, i′) ≤ n2
or min(i, i′) > n2 as ii
′ /∈ µˆn,n−κ−1. Moreover, for i ∈ N : i < n2 and j = n2 + (i+ κ)% n2 it holds that
i j /∈ µˆn,n−κ−1; thus i j ∈ µ˜n,κ . Therefore µ˜n,κ must be connected.
Assume instead that n is odd. By the above argument there are at least two connected subnet-
works consisting of agents in ∪ι{1,..,κ2 }{ι , ιn,κ(ι)} and agents who are connected through agent, n, i.e.
N\(∪ι{1,..,κ2 }{ι , ιn,κ(ι)}). If κ ≤
n−1
2 where i =
κ
2 , i
′ = κ2 + 1 and j =
n−1
2 +
κ
2 + 1 then i j, i
′ j ∈ µ˜n,κ
and thus µ˜n,κ is connected. If κ > n−12 where i =
κ
2 , i
′ = κ2 + 1 and j =
n−1
2 +(ι + κ + 1)%
n−1
2 then
i j, i′ j ∈ µ˜n,κ and thus µ˜n,κ is connected.
Appendix B. Proofs
Appendix B.1. Sorting: no externalities
Proposition 1: If there is supermodularity and no externalities then for any pairwise stable network it
holds that there is sorting in type.
Proof. Suppose the claim is false. Let q be the lowest index for which the condition fail: for all l < q it
holds that X (νi(µ)/{ j})l ≥X (ν j(µ)/{i})l+l∗ where l∗ = max(k j(µ)− ki(µ),0). Thus there are two
agents i′, j′ such that:
x j′ =X (ν j(µ))q, j′ ∈ (ν j(µ)\(νi(µ)∪{i})),
xi′ <X (ν j(µ))q, i′ ∈ (νi(µ)\(ν j(µ)∪{ j})).
Recall k∗ = min(ki(µ),k j(µ)). The argument why there must exist an agent i′ in ν j(µ) but not in
(ν j(µ)∪{ j}) is that |{ι ∈ νi(µ) : xι < x j′}|> |{ι ∈ ν j(µ) : xι < x j′}|. This follows as by construction it
holds that |{ι ∈ νi(µ) : xι < x j′}|= k∗−q+1 and |{ι ∈ ν j(µ) : xι < x j′}| ≤ k∗−q.
The agents are such that xi > x j,xi′ < x j′ as well as i j′, ji′ /∈ µ . However, this fact implies that there
is a violation of strong stability: agents i, i′, j, j′ can deviate by destroying {i j, i′ j′} and forming {i j′, i′ j}
and thus increase payoffs due to supermodularity (cf. Equation 2). From Lemma 1 it follows that pairwise
stability is also violated if strong stability is violated.
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Appendix B.2. Sorting: externalities - finite population
Lemma 2. Suppose that minx∈X nx > κ , κ ≥ 2; if ∃i ∈ N : i) |{i′ ∈ νi(µ) : xi′ = xi}| < nx − 1, ii)
mini′∈Nx\νi(µ) ki′(µ) = κ , and iii) maxi′∈Nx\νi(µ) |{i′′ ∈ νi′(µ) : xi′′ 6= x}| = 0 then ∃i′, i′′ ∈ µ such that
i′, i′′ /∈ νi(µ) and pi′i′′(µ\{i′i′′})<∈ f ty
Proof. Suppose that for i ∈ N the conditions i)-iv) are met but the lemma is not true. If i′ ∈ Nx and
ii′ /∈ µ then there must exist some i′′ ∈ Nx such that i′i′′ ∈ µ and i′′ /∈ νi(µ) as mini′∈Nx\νi(µ) ki′(µ) = κ and
maxi′∈Nx\νi(µ) |{i′′ ∈ νi′(µ) : xi′′ 6= x}| = 0. If pi′i′′(µ\{i′i′′}) <∈ f ty then the proof is terminated so we
must assume pi′i′′(µ\{i′i′′}) =∈ f ty.
As pi′i′′(µ\{i′i′′}) =∈ f ty then there must exist two components in µ , µ ′,µ ′′ ⊆ µ\({ι ′l ι ′′l }, where
in each component µ ′ or µ ′′ there are at least κ + 1 agents of type x (as for any ι ∈ (νi′(µ)∪ νi′′(µ))
it holds that xι = x). Moreover, i can at most be connected to one of i′, i′′ in µ\({i′i′′} as otherwise
i′, i′′ would be connected in µ\{i′i′′}. Denote the component {µ ′,µ ′′} where i is part of as µ˜ and define
N˜ = {ι ∈ Nx\νi(µ) : ∃ι ′ ∈ N : ιι ′ ∈ µ˜}.
Let ι0 ∈ argmaxι∈i′,i′′ pι i and iteratively ιl ∈ νιl−1(µ), l ∈ N. Moreover, there must be only a unique
path in µ\{i′i′′} between any two agents ι , ι ′ ∈ N˜ as otherwise iι , iι ′ /∈ µ but pιι ′(µ˜\{i′i′′}) <∈ f ty -
in this case we could instead denote i′ = ι and i′′ = ι ′. However, the single unique path entails that at
level l or below there are ∑lq=0(κ−1)q agents; thus nx ≥ ∑lq=0(κ−1)q. Let l be the minimal q such that
∀ ∈ ι ∈ N˜ : piι ≤ q; as nx is finite such a q must exist. In addition, as there is a unique path between agents
in µ then any agent ι ∈ N˜ : pιι0 = l has only one link, and thus its degree is less than κ (as κ ≥ 2). This
violates the condition that all i′ ∈ N where xi′ = x has ki′ = κ .
Theorem 1: Suppose there is supermodularity, hyperbolic decay, a non-singular degree quota and type
self-sufficiency then:
(i) (Mˆ∩MmaxUδ>
¯
δ ) = /0;
(ii) Mˆ ⊆Mp−stbδ≤δ¯ ;
(iii) Mˆ = Mp−stbδ∈(0,δ¯ ) if |X |= 2
(iv) Mˆ 6= /0 if for all x ∈ X : (κ ·nx) ∈ 2N.
where Mˆ = Mp−srt:conn∩Mno−slack and threshold bounds
¯
δ , δ¯ are defined as:
¯
δ ≤ min
x,x˜∈X
(
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜+ 12 nxnx˜
)
, Zˆx,x˜ =
Z(x,x)+Z(x˜,x˜)
2Z(x,x˜) −1
δ¯ ≥ min
x,x˜∈X
(
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜+max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜|·zˆx,x˜
)
, zˆx,x˜ =
z(argminx,x˜ nx, argmaxx,x˜ nx)
Z(x, x˜)
.
Proof. We begin showing properties (i) and (ii). Suppose µ ∈Mp−srt:conn∩Mno−slack - we will demonstrate
there are thresholds on δ such that µ pairwise stability and efficiency. We’re only interested in the minimal
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thresholds such that for all values of externalities below those then stability and efficiency holds. Thus it
is sufficient to evaluate the deviations from the network where the net gains are highest.
The losses from breaking a link i j ∈ µ can be shown to have bounded from below such that: ≥
δ · (1−Z(x,x)). Suppose that nx = κ + 1,x ∈ X then {i j ∈ µ : xi = x,xi′ = x} is a clique (i.e. any i, i′ of
type x are linked). This entails that pii′(µ\{ii′}) = 2 and thus pii′(µ\{ii′})<∈ f ty. Suppose instead that
nx < κ + 1,x ∈ X then by Lemma 2 there exists some i, j, both of type x such that pii′(µ\{ii′}) <∈ f ty.
Thus when evaluating losses at the threshold we can assume that when deleting some link i j that i, j are
connected in µ\{i j}. Although the length of the shortest paths may increase, there will still be an indirect
connection and therefore no loss of utility for anyone but the two agents who lose their link. Therefore
we assume throughout that when evaluating thresholds if ii′ is deleted in Mp−srt:conn∩Mno−slack then only
agents i, i′, who must be of same type, will each lose (1−δ ) · z(x,x) while no other agents of incur a loss.
Suppose two agents i, j of distinct types respectively x, x˜ deviate by forming a link and delete a link
each from µ . The total loss for i and j for deleting a link each is:
(1−δ ) · [z(x,x)+ z(x˜, x˜)] = (1−δ ) · (Zˆx,x˜+1) ·Z(x, x˜).
The benefits gained for agent i for establishing a link to j is [1+(nx˜−1) · (1− δ )] · z(x, x˜). Thus the
total benefits gained for i and j from pairwise deviation can be bounded as follows.
[1+(nx−1) ·δ ] · z(x, x˜)+ [1+(nx˜−1) ·δ ] · z(x˜,x),
= 〈1+[max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜| · zˆx,x˜−1] ·δ 〉 ·Z(x, x˜).
where zˆx,x˜ =
z(argminx,x˜ nx,argmaxx,x˜ nx)
Z(x,x˜) .
We can derive the threshold for pairwise stability:
(1−δ ) · (Zˆx,x˜+1) ·Z(x, x˜) = 〈1+[max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜| · zˆx,x˜−1] ·δ 〉 ·Z(x, x˜),
(1−δ ) · (Zˆx,x˜+1) = 〈1+[max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜| · zˆx,x˜−1] ·δ 〉 ,
Zˆx,x˜ =
[
max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜| · zˆx,x˜+ Zˆx,x˜
] ·δ ,
δ =
Zˆx,x˜
max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜| · zˆx,x˜+ Zˆx,x˜
. (B.1)
Thus we can establish a lower bound for δ¯ (i.e. the upper bound in δ for pairwise stability of µ) by
taking the minimum of left-hand-side in Equation B.1; thus it follows that: δ¯ ≥minx,x˜∈X
(
Zˆx,x˜
max(nx,nx˜)+Zˆx,x˜
)
.
We can do a similar procedure for finding
¯
δ for when the aggregate gains of establishing links across
types is zero. We will evaluate the bridged network µ˜ = µ ∪{i j, i′ j′}\{ii′, j j′} where xi′ = xi and x j′ = x j.
The total loss U(µ)−U(µ\{ii′, j j′}) is equal to double that of i, j suffers, i.e. 2(1−δ ) · Zˆx,x˜ ·Z(x, x˜).
The gains from connecting are two links of value Z(x, x˜) as well as nx · nx− 2 indirect connections
(between all agents of type x and x˜) of value Z(x, x˜) · δ . It follows that the total gains in benefits are
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Z(x, x˜) · [2+(nx ·nx˜−2) ·δ ]. The threshold δ can be found from finding when gains equal losses:
2(1−δ ) · (Zˆx,x˜+1) ·Z(x, x˜) = 2Z(x, x˜)+(nx ·nx˜−2) ·Z(x, x˜) ·δ ,
(1−δ ) · (Zˆx,x˜+1) = 1+(12 nx ·nx˜−1) ·δ ,
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜+ 12 nx ·nx˜
= δ . (B.2)
It follows that the threshold
¯
δ (which is such that every δ above implies there exists an efficient
deviation from µ) must be at least the minimum of left-hand-side in Equation B.2 over possible types, i.e.
it must hold that
¯
δ ≤minx,x˜∈X
(
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜+ 12 nx·nx
)
. This terminates the proof for part (i) of the theorem.
We move on to property (iii) of the proof where we establish characterization of pairwise stable net-
works. We need to show that Mˆ = Mp−stbδ≤δ¯ if |X | = 2. From property (ii) Mˆ ⊆M
p−stb
δ≤δ¯ thus it remains to
show: that Mp−stbδ≤δ¯ ⊆ Mˆ. As |X |= 2 it holds that X = {x,x}. Define ϒ:
ϒ= (1−δ ) · [z(x¯, x¯)+ z(
¯
x,
¯
x)]− [1+(n
¯
x−1) ·δ ] · z(¯x, x¯)− [1+(nx¯−1) ·δ ] · z(x¯, ¯x).
As δ <
¯
δ it follows from Equation B.1 that:
ϒ> 0. (B.3)
Suppose µ /∈Mp−sort . Define a sequence of agent pairs, i0 j0, i1 j1, ... as follows. Let agents i0, j0 ∈ N
be such that xi 6= x j and i j ∈ µ; such i0, j0 must exist as µ /∈Mp−sort . Without loss of generality let xi0 = x
and x j0 = x˜ where x, x˜ ∈ X , and assume that:
−τi0 j0 > (1−δ ) · z(x˜, x˜)− [1+(nx˜−1) ·δ ] · z(x˜,x). (B.4)
The above inequality must hold for either type x or x˜ as we substitute labels for i, j as well as x, x˜ due
to ϒ> 0.
Let l ∈ N. It is assumed that for any q < l : xiq = x,x jq = x˜ . Also assume an associated set collection
of links, µl−1 ⊂ µ , and let the set be defined as µl−1 = ∪l−1q=0{iq jq} such that for each q < l: iqiq−1 /∈ µ if
q is odd and jq jq−1 /∈ µ if q is even. At step q ∈ N let ιq = iq−1 if q is even else denote ιq = jl−1. Also let
ηq ∈ {iq−1, jq−1} : ηq 6= ιq. This entails that ι1 = i0 and η1 = j0.
Define xq = x, x˜q = x˜ if q is even else vice versa. Also let Nq = {ι ∈ N : xι = xq}.
Suppose that at every q ∈ N : q < l it holds that ι ′q /∈ νιq(µ), xι ′l = xl and let η ′l ∈ νι ′l (µ). Finally also
define at every q < l the move ∆µq = µ ∪{ιqι ′q}\{ιqηq, ι ′qη ′q} and let:
∆Uq = uιq(∆µq)−uιq(µ)+uι ′q(∆µq)−uι ′q(µ) (B.5)
∆Uˆq = uiq(∆µq+1q:even)−uiq(µ)+u jq(∆µq+1q:odd )−u jq(µ) (B.6)
Note that ∆µq = {iqiq−1} ∪ ∆µ˜q if q is even and ∆µq = { jq jq−1} ∪ ∆µ˜q if q is even; ∆µ˜q = µ ∪
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\{iq−1 jq−1, iq jq}. By inserting i, j for ι ,η we yield the following expression:
l−1
∑
q=l′
∆Uq =
l−2
∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq+uι ′l−1(∆µl−1)−uι ′l−1(µ)+uιl′ (∆µl′)−uιl′ (µ) (B.7)
Assume that for every q ∈ N where q < l:
|{ι ∈ N : xι = xq ∧ pιιq(µ)<∈ f ty ∧ pιιq(µ ∪{ιqι ′q}\{ηqιq}) =∈ f ty}| = 0 (B.8)
|{ι ∈ N : xι = xq ∧ pιι ′q(µ)<∈ f ty ∧ pιι ′q(∆µq) =∈ f ty}| = 0 (B.9)
Suppose Equation B.8 is satisfied. It follows that net gains of benefits for ιq from deleting the link with
ηq while forming a link together with ι ′q can be bounded: the upper bound on losses is when a connection
is lost to all agents of type x˜q: [1+(nq−1) ·δ ] · z(xq,xq); the lower bound on gains is (1−δ ) · z(xq, x˜q) as
the distance between ιqι ′q is shortened to 1.
uιq(µ ∪{ιqι ′q}\{ιqηq})−uιq(µ) ≥ (1−δ ) · z(xq,xq)− [1+(nq−1) ·δ ] · z(xq, x˜q) (B.10)
Suppose Equations B.8 and B.9 - we can demonstrate that Equation B.9 also where we replace ι ′q
with ιq. If pιqι ′q(µ) <∈ f ty then as it also holds that pιqι ′q(∆µq) <∈ f ty it follows that pι ′qι ′′q (µ) <∈ f ty
and pι ′qι ′′q (∆µq) =∈ f ty which violates Equation B.9. Thus it must be that pιqι ′q(µ) =∈ f ty. Suppose
instead pιqι ′q(µ) =∈ f ty. If ∃ι ′′q ∈ N : pιqι ′′q (µ ∪{ιqι ′q}\{ιqηq})<∈ f ty ∧ pιqι ′′q (∆µq) =∈ f ty then it must
be that pη ′qι ′′q (µ)<∈ f ty and thus pι ′qι ′′q (µ)<∈ f ty which implies that pιqι ′′q (µ) =∈ f ty. However, this is a
violation of pιqι ′′q (µ)<∈ f ty.
|{ι ∈ N : xι = xq ∧ pιιq(µ)<∈ f ty ∧ pιιq(∆µq) =∈ f ty}| = 0 (B.11)
Analogue to the derivation of Inequality B.10 the net gains are bounded when Equations B.8 and B.9
are satisfied:
min
ι∈{ιq,ι ′q}
[uι(∆µq)−uι(µ)] ≥ (1−δ ) · z(xq,xq)− [1+(nq−1) ·δ ] · z(xq, x˜q), (B.12)
One implication of Inequalities B.4 and B.12 if l > 1:
uι1(∆µ1)−uι1(µ)− τι1η1 ≥ (1−δ ) · z(x,x)− [1+(nx−1) ·δ ] · z(x, x˜)− τi0 j0
uι1(∆µ1)−uι1(µ)− τι1η1 ≥ ϒ (B.13)
Another implication of Inequality B.12 is that:
uiq(∆µq+1odd(q))−uiq(µ)+u jq(∆µq+1even(q))−u jq(µ) ≥ ϒ, ∀q ∈ [[1, l−1]] (B.14)
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In order for ∆µq not to be a profitable pairwise deviation it must hold that:
uιq(µ)+uι ′q(µ)+ τι ′qη ′q + τιqηq ≥ uιq(∆µq)+uι ′q(∆µq)
τι ′qη ′q ≥ ∆Uq+ τηqιq
We can rewrite the above inequality using that ι ′q−1 = ηq,η ′q−1 = ιq and thus τι ′q−1η ′q−1 = τηqιq . We also
substitute in Equation B.5 and assume the above inequality holds for any q < l:
τι ′l−1η ′l−1 ≥ ∆Ul−1+ τι ′l−2η ′l−2
τι ′l−1η ′l−1 ≥
l−1
∑
q=l′
∆Uq+ τι ′l′−1η ′l′−1 (B.15)
As τηl ιl = τι ′l−1η ′l−1 and −τιlηl = τηl ιl it follows that using Equation B.7:
−τιlηl ≥
l−1
∑
q=l′
∆Uq+ τι ′l′−1η ′l′−1
=
l−2
∑
q=1
∆Uˆq+uι ′l−1(∆µl−1)−uι ′l−1(µ)+uι1(∆µ1)−uι1(µ)+ τι ′0η ′0
=
l−2
∑
q=1
∆Uˆq+uηl (∆µl−1)−uηl (µ)+uι1(∆µ1)−uι1(µ)− τι1η1 (B.16)
Define the set of partners for ιl:
Nˆ∗l (ιl,µl−1) = {ι ∈ N\{ιl} : xι = xιl , pιιl (µ)<∈ f ty, pιιl (µ\{ιlηl}) =∈ f ty}
Nˆ∗∗l (ιl,µl−1) = {ι ∈ N\{ιl} : xι = xιl , ιιl /∈ µ}
Nˆl(ιl,µl−1) =
Nˆ∗l (ιl,µl−1) if Nˆ∗l (ιl,µl−1) 6= /0,N∗∗l (ιl,µl−1) else. (B.17)
A property of Nˆl is that Nˆl 6= /0; this follows as minxˆ∈X nxˆ ≥ κ + 1. Let ι ′l ∈ Nˆl which implies that
Equation B.8 holds.
Suppose that kι ′l (µ)< κ . As Equation B.8 holds it follows that
uι ′q(µ ∪{ιqι ′q}\{ιqηq})−uι ′q(µ)≥ (1−δ ) · z(xq,xq),
and thus uι ′q(µ ∪{ιqι ′q}\{ιqηq})> 0.
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We can also derive utility bounds using Inequality B.16 along with Inequalities B.3, B.13:
uιl (µ ∪{ιlι ′l}\{ιlηl})−uιl (µ)− τιlηl ,
≥ uιl (µ ∪{ιlι ′l}\{ιlηl})−uιl (µ)+uηl (∆µl−1)−uηl (µ)+
l−2
∑
q=1
∆Uˆq+uι1(∆µ1)−uι1(µ)− τι1η1 ,
≥ l ·ϒ,
> 0,
thus ιl, ι ′l can profitably from deviate pairwise. Thus it must be that kι ′l (µ) = κ .
Suppose there exists ι ′l ∈ Nl\νi(µ), ι ′′l ∈ Nl\{ιl, ι ′l} such that ι ′l ι ′′l ∈ µ , pι ′l ι ′′l (µ\{ι ′l ι ′′l }) <∈ f ty and
τι ′l ι ′′l ≤ 0. This entails that uι ′l (∆µˆl)− uι ′l (µ) ≥ 0 where ∆µl = µ ∪{ιlι ′l}\{ιlηl, ι ′l ι ′′l }. This follows from
uι ′l (∆µl)− uι ′l (µ) = uι ′l (∆µl)− uι ′l (µ ∩∆µl)− [uι ′l (µ ∩∆µl)− uι ′l (µ)] and uι ′l (∆µl)− uι ′l (µ ∩∆µl) ≥ 1−
z(x,x) and uι ′l (µ ∩∆µl)−uι ′l (µ) = 1− z(x,x). As τι ′l ι ′′l ≤ 0 it follows that that utility for ι ′l is:
uι ′l (∆µˆl)−uι ′l (µ)− τι ′l ι ′′l ≥ 0.
And utility for ιl can bounded be as follows using Inequality B.10 for uιl (∆µˆl)− uιl (µ) as Equation
B.8 holds :
uιl (∆µˆl)−uιl (µ)− τιlηl
= uιl (∆µˆl)−uιl (µ)+ τηl ιl
≥
l−1
∑
q=1
∆Uq+uιl (∆µˆl)−uιl (µ)+ τ j0i0
=
l−2
∑
q=1
∆Uˆq+uιl (∆µˆl)−uιl (µ)+uηl (∆µl−1)−uηl (µ)+ui0(∆µ1)−ui0(µ)− τi0 j0
≥ l ·ϒ
> 0 (B.18)
The above inequalities entails that ιl, ι ′l can deviate profitably pairwise; this is a violation of pairwise
stability and thus cannot be true. Thus there exists no ι ′l ι
′′
l ∈ µ such that ι ′l ∈ Nl\νi(µ), ι ′′l ∈ Nl\{ιl, ι ′l} as
well as pι ′l ι ′′l (µ\{ι ′l ι ′′l })<∈ f ty and τι ′l ι ′′l ≤ 0.
Suppose that ∀ι ′l ∈ Nl : 6= xistsη ′l ∈ νι ′l (µ\µl−1) : xη ′l 6= xl . This entails that ∀ι ′l ∈ Nl : 6= xistsη ′l ∈
νι ′l (µ) : xη ′l 6= xl as kι ′l (µ\µl−1) = kι ′l (µ). By Lemma 2 it follows there exists ι ′l , ι ′′l ∈ Nl\νi(µ) such that
pι ′l ι ′′l (µ\{ι ′l ι ′′l }) <∈ f ty, ι ′l ι ′′l ∈ µ and τι ′l ι ′′l ≤ 0 which by the arguments above cannot be true. Therefore
there has to exist some ι ′l ∈ Nl for which there is an agent η ′l ∈ νι ′l (µ\µl−1) where it holds that xη ′l 6= xl .
A duplicate occurs if il−1, jl−1 ∈ µl−2. That is for some l′ < l it holds that either ιl,ηl = ιl′ ,ηl′ if l− l′
is even or ιl,ηl = ηl′ , ιl′ if l− l′ is odd.
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If l− l′ is odd, then τι ′l′−1η ′l′−1 =−τι ′l−1η ′l−1 and therefore we can reduce the Inequality B.15:
0 ≥
l−1
∑
q=l′
[uιq(∆µq)−uιq(µ)+uι ′q(∆µq)−uι ′q(µ)]+2τι ′l′−1η ′l′−1
=
l−2
∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq+uι ′l−1(∆µl−1)−uι ′l−1(µ)+uιl′ (∆µl′)−uιl′ (µ)+2τι ′l′−1η ′l′−1
=
l−2
∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq+2 ·
〈
uη ′l′−1(∆µl′)−uη ′l′−1(µ)+ τι ′l′−1η ′l′−1
〉
=
l−2
∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq+2 ·
〈
uη ′l′−1(∆µl′)−uη ′l′−1(µ)+
l′−1
∑
q=1
∆Uq+ τι ′0η ′0
〉
=
l−2
∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq+2 ·
l′−1
∑
q=1
∆Uˆq+2 · [uι1(∆µ1)−uι1(µ)− τι1η1 ]
≥ (l+ l′) ·ϒ
> 0,
thus there must be a feasible pairwise deviation for ιq, ι ′q where q ∈ [[1, l−1]].
If l − l′ is even then τι ′l−1η ′l−1 = τι ′l′−1ηl′−1 ; thus Inequality B.15 for no pairwise deviation becomes:
0≥ ∑l−1q=l′ ∆Uq. This can in turn be rewritten as follows:
0 ≥
l−2
∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq+uι ′l−1(∆µl−1)−uι ′l−1(µ)+uιl′ (∆µl′)−uιl′ (µ)
Using that ιq = η ′q−1 and η ′l′−1 = η
′
l−1 we get: 0≥ ∑l−1q=l′ ∆Uˆq. Recall that for all q ∈ N : q < l it holds
that ∆Uˆq ≥ ϒ where ϒ> 0. Thus there must be a feasible pairwise deviation.
Due to ι ′l ,η
′
l = ηl+1, ιl+1 it follows that it cannot be that ι
′
lη
′
l ∈ µl−1 as otherwise il jl ∈ µl−1. This
entails 6= xistsι ′l ∈ Nl : ∃η ′l ∈ νι ′l (µl−1). Therefore we can assume ∀ι ′l ∈ Nl :6= xistsη ′l ∈ νι ′l (µl−1) and thus
∀ι ′l ∈ Nl : kι ′l (µ\µl−1) = kι ′l (µ).
Suppose that Equation B.9 is violated for any ι ′l ∈ Nˆl . This is equivalent to it holds for any ι ′l ∈ Nˆl
where η ′l ∈ νι ′(µ) that there is some other ι ′′l ∈ Nˆl such that pι ′l ι ′′l (∆µl) =∈ f ty. Let ι
(1)
l = ι
′
l . As Equation
B.9 must hold for any ι ′l ∈ Nˆl we can reproduce the argument iteratively and thus for ι(q)l ∈ Nˆl,q ∈N there
is some η(q)l ∈ νι(q)l (µ) such that for some ι
(q+1)
l ∈ Nˆl\{ι(1)l , .., ι(q)l } it holds that pι(1)l ι(q+1)l (∆µl) =∈ f ty.
However, as n <∈ f ty it follows that there for some q ∈ N that Nl\{ι(1)l , .., ι(q)l } = /0. Thus let instead
ι ′l = ι
(q)
l ; for any η
′
l ∈ νι ′l (µ) there is no ι ′′l ∈ Nl such that pι ′l ι ′′l (µ) =∈ f ty. This contradicts that Equation
B.9 is violated for agent ι ′l = ι
(q)
l .
Suppose µ /∈Mno−surpl.. This would entail that ∃i ∈ N : ki(µ) < κ . As nx > κ there has to ∃i′ ∈ N :
xi′ = xi, ii′ /∈ µ . Suppose that ki′ < κ then ∑ι∈{i,i′}[uι(µ ∪{ii′})− uι(µ)] > 0 and thus ii′ can be formed
profitably pairwise. Moreover, as ki′(µ) = κ it follows that ∃i′′ ∈ νi′ : ii′′ /∈ µ,xi′′ = xi. By Lemma 2 it
follows there exists ι , ι ′ ∈ N˜\νi(µ) such that pιι ′(µ\{ιι ′})<∈ f ty, ιι ′ ∈ µ and τιι ′ ≤ 0. This entails that
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uι(µ)−uι(µ\{ιι ′})+ τιι ′ ≤ (1−δ )z(x,x). Moreover, as
∑ j∈{i,ι}[u j(µ ∪{iι}\{ιι ′})−u j(µ\{ιι ′})]≥ (1−δ ) ·Z(x,x) it holds that:
∑
j∈{i,ι}
[u j(µ ∪{iι}\{ιι ′})−u j(µ)]− τιι ′ ≥ (1−δ ) · z(x,x)
.
Thus i, ι can deviate profitably pairwise which contradicts pairwise Nash stability. Therefore it must
be that µ ∈Mno−surpl.
Suppose µ /∈Mp−sort+conn. As µ ∈Mp−sort ∩Mno−surpl. there exist i, i′, j, j′ ∈ N : xi = xi′ = x j = x j′
and i j, i′ j′ ∈ µ and pii′(µ) =∈ f ty. Without loss of generality we assume that τi j,τi′ j′ ≤ 0 (otherwise we
could simply switch identities some i’s and j’s). This entails:
min
ι∈{i,i′}
[uι(µ\{i j, i′ j′})−uι(µ)]+ τi j + τi′ j′ ≤ 2(1−δ ) · z(x,x)
Also we have that:
min
ι∈{i,i′}
[uι(µ ∪{ii′}\{i j, i′ j′})−uι(µ\{i j, i′ j′})]≥ (κ+1) · (1−δ ) · z(x,x)
This entails that ∑ι∈{i,i′}[uι(µ ∪{ii′}\{i j, i′ j′})−uι(µ)]−τi j−τi′ j′ ≥ κ · (1−δ ) ·Z(x,x); thus i, i′ can
deviate profitably. Thus we have shown that Mp−stbδ≤δ¯ ⊆ Mˆ which terminates the proof of property (iii).
Finally property (iv) follows as Fact 1 can be applied to the subset of agents associated with each type
as ∀x ∈ X : nx > κ and κ ·nx ∈ 2N.
Proposition 2: Suppose that conditions for suboptimal sorting from Theorem 1 are valid and there are
two types then a policy maker can implement a welfare improving network when δ ∈ (
¯
δ , δ¯ ) from a sorted
network µ ∈ Mˆ.
Proof. Let µ ∈ Mˆ and δ ∈ (
¯
δ , δ¯ ). By construction there exists a network µ˜ which has higher aggregate
utility. Let the two pairs of agents ii′, j j′ be agents such that µ˜ = µ ∪ {i j, i′ j′}\{ii′, j j′} and xi = xi′ = x
and x j = x j′ = x. Specify a link-contingent contract to i, j where µˆ = µ ∪{i j}\{ii′, j j′} such that:
∀ιι ′ ∈ {i j, i′ j′} : Cιι ′ +Cι ′ι ∈ ( 12 [Z(x,x)+Z(x˜, x˜)−2Z(x, x˜)], 12 [U(µ˜)−U(µ)]), (B.19)
∀ιι ′ /∈ {i j, ji, i′ j′, j′i′} : Cιι ′ = 0. (B.20)
By Theorem 1 we know that µ is pairwise stable. Pairwise stability implies that 12 [Z(x,x)+Z(x˜, x˜)−
2Z(x, x˜)] > bi(µ)− bi(µˆ) + b j(µ)− b j(µˆ) as deviation is not profitable. Using this fact together with
Inequality B.19 it follows that:
Ci j +C ji > bi(µ)−bi(µˆ)+b j(µ)−b j(µˆ).
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The above inequality entails agents i, j are a blocking coalition that can gain by deviating to µˆ; this
blocking move is also the only profitable move for i, j due to pairwise stability of µ and Equation B.20.
In network µˆ agents i′, j′ have an incentive to form a link with one another as both have surplus link
capacity (i.e. degree below the quota) and forming a link is profitable from Inequality B.19. Moreover,
we show in the following that this move is the one that ensures the highest aggregate net benefits to i′, j′.
We begin with showing that linking across types to other agents of type x, x˜ is not profitable. Suppose
i′ links across types to another agent j′′ ∈ {ι 6= j′ : xι = x j′}. First, note the pairwise deviation from µ to
form i′ j′′ is unprofitable (due to pairwise stability), thus it less profitable than forming i′ j′ from µ (which
is profitable by Inequality B.19). Second, the net-increase in value of the pairwise deviation to form i′ j′
over i′ j′′ increases from µ to µˆ - this is true as j′ loses the link with i from µ while j′′ has an unchanged
number - thus j′ will have a weakly lower opportunity cost of deleting links in µˆ . The same argument can
be applied to j′ for i′′ ∈ {ι 6= i′ : xι = xi′}.
We turn to showing that linking to other agents of same type (staying sorted) is not more profitable
as well. Suppose i′ and j′ link to same types as themselves respectively, i.e. i′′ ∈ {ι 6= i′ : xι = xi′} and
j′′ ∈ {ι 6= j′ : xι = x j′}. Suppose ii′′ ∈ µ then no feasible pairwise moves to same type can exist in µˆ as the
move can only involve deleting links; same is true if j j′′ ∈ µ . Thus instead we use ii′′, j j′′ /∈ µ . It must be
that any pairwise deviation forming either ii′′ or j j′′ from µ is unprofitable (as µ is pairwise stable); this
implies that for any ι ∈ νi′′(µˆ) and ι ′ ∈ ν j′′(µˆ) it holds that:
bi′(µˆ ∪{i′i′′}\{i′′ι})−bi′(µˆ)+bi′′(µˆ ∪{i′i′′}\{i′′ι})−bi′′(µˆ)− τi′′ι ≤ z(x,x), (B.21)
b j′(µˆ ∪{ j′ j′′}\{ j′′ι ′})−b j′(µˆ)+b j′′(µˆ ∪{ j′ j′′}\{ j′′ι ′})−b j′′(µˆ)− τ j′′ι ′ ≤ z(x˜, x˜). (B.22)
As bi′(µ˜)−bi′(µˆ)+b j′(µ˜)−b j′(µˆ) = z(x, x˜)+ z(x˜,x) it follows that
bi′(µ˜)−bi′(µˆ)+b j′(µ˜)−b j′(µˆ)+Ci′ j′+C j′i′ > z(x,x)+ z(x˜, x˜).
The above inequality implies together with Inequalities B.21 and B.22 that the total gains for i′ and j′
exceeds the total value that could be generated from alternative deviations. Thus there are two pairwise
moves from µ to µˆ and from µˆ to µ˜ which both provide strictly higher utility to the deviating agents.
Pairwise stability follows from three arguments. First, all deviations among agents where only links
in µ˜ ∩ µ are deleted will provide at most the same value in µ˜ that the deviations did in µ - this follows
as these agents all have the same links and in µ˜ all agents are connected in µ˜ and thus only direct links
matter. This upper limit too gains from deviations implies none of these moves can be profitable as they
were unprofitable form µ . Second, deviations that involve deletion of links in µ˜\µ are shown above to
provide strictly higher value than any other deviations - thus deviating from µ˜ must also provide strictly
lower value.
Appendix B.3. Sorting: externalities - infinite population
Proposition 3: If there is supermodularity, a degree quota and constant decay with asymptotic indepen-
dence then there is asymptotic perfect sorting for strongly stable networks.
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Proof. Under asymptotic independence it follows that average per agent utility for type x under asymptotic
perfect sorting converges to (using a geometric series):
(κ−1)δ
1− (κ−1)δ z(x,x)
Let ωxx˜ = κ ·E[δ pi j |xi = x,x j = x˜]. Suppose that for two types, x, x˜ there is not perfect sorting, and in
particular there is some mixing between them, i.e. ωxx˜ > 0; the average per agent utility is:[
(κ−1)δ
1− (κ−1)δ −ωx
]
· z(x,x)+ωx · z(x, x˜).
Each agent will almost surely have κ links as it is assumed that each link adds positive value and there
are asymptotic infinite agents (only a finite number can then not fulfill the degree quota).
As we have a finite set of types we can assume then for large populations there is a subset of types,
Xˆ ⊆ X , where for every type x ∈ Xˆ it holds that there is an asymptotic strictly positive share of the total
number of agents of that type, i.e., limn→∈ f ty(|{i ∈ Nn}xi=x|/n) > 0. If there is only one such type, i.e.
|Xˆ |= 1, then asymptotic perfect sorting follows by assumption as the asymptotic number of links is κ .
For any two types x, x˜ ∈ Xˆ which are mixing their average utility is:
(κ−1)δ
1− (κ−1)δ
[
nx · z(x,x)+nx˜ · z(x˜, x˜)
nx+nx˜
]
− 1
2
·
[
nx ·ωxx˜
nx+nx˜
]
· [Z(x,x)+Z(x˜, x˜)−2Z(x, x˜)].
As there is supermodularity it follows that Z(x,x)+Z(x˜, x˜)−2Z(x, x˜)> 0 and thus mixing must decrease
utility. The same argument can be applied by mixing between multiple types.
Appendix B.4. Network structure
Proposition 4: Suppose there is monotonicity and no externalities in link value then the set of pairwise
stable networks has degree monotonicity.
Proof. Suppose the claim is false; that is, for some pairwise stable network µ ∈Mp−stb it holds for two
agents i and j that xi > x j but ki(µ) < k j(µ). The condition that ki(µ) < k j(µ) entails there is another
agent who is in ν j(µ) but not in νi(µ) which entails that ν j(µ)\(νi(µ)∪{i}) 6= /0.
Let j′ ∈ ν j(µ)\(νi(µ)∪{i}). From monotonicity of Z it holds that Zi j′ > Z j j′ as xi > x j. From the
cost technologies (either convex or a degree quota) it must be that
ci(µ ∪{i j′})− ci(µ)≤ c j(µ)− c j(µ\{ j j′}),
as ki(µ) < k j(µ). Combining the restriction on benefits it follows that the value created by forming i j′
and deleting j j′ can be restricted:
Zi j′− (ci(µ ∪{i j′})− ci(µ))> Z j j′− (c j(µ)− c j(µ\{ j j′})).
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As the move to (µ ∪ i j′)\{ j j′} is feasible (and respects the degree quota if there is one), it follows
that strong stability is violated as it implies that µ is not efficient. From Lemma 1 it follows that pairwise
stability is also violated if the claim is false.
Proposition 5: If there are supermodularity, monotonicity in link value as well as complete heterogeneity
but no externalities then every pairwise stable network has sorting in degree.
Proof. As there are no externalities, supermodularity and monotonicity in link value then Proposition 1
and 4 must hold. In addition, as agents i and j are distinct under complete heterogeneity then either xi > x j
or xi′ > xi. As ki(µ)≥ k j(µ) it must be that xi > xi′ as the converse would violate Proposition 4.
From Proposition 1 it is known that if there are two agents such that xi > xi′ then this entails that for
l = 1, ...,k j(µ) :X (νi(µ)/{ j})l ≥X (ν j(µ)/{i})l . This inequality entails there are exactly two possible
cases for any index l = 1, ...,k j(µ). The first case is thatX (νi(µ)/{ j})l =X (ν j(µ)/{i})l . In this case
K (νi(µ)/{i})l =K (ν j(µ)/{i})l as the agent linked to i and j must be the same due to complete hetero-
geneity. Else in the other case where X (νi(µ)/{ j})l >X (ν j(µ)/{i})l then by reapplying Proposition
4 it follows that,K (νi(µ)/{i})l ≥K (ν j(µ)/{i})l.
Proposition 6: Suppose there are externalities as well as monotonicity and no modularity then the set of
strongly stable networks has δ -decay monotonicity.
Proof. The no modularity condition implies that individual link value is independent of own talent and
thus separable for any xˆ∈ X : Z(xˆ, x˜) = Z˜(x˜)+ Z˜(xˆ) where Z˜ is the contribution to the link value for a given
level of talent. Thus we can rewrite Equation 1:
∑
i∈N
bi(µ) = ∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
δ pi j(µ)−1z(xi,x j),
= ∑
i j∈µc
δ pi j(µ)−1Z(xi,x j),
= ∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
δ pi j(µ)−1Z˜(xi),
= ∑
i∈N
dδi (µ) · Z˜(xi).
Due to monotonicity in link value it also holds that ∂∂xi Z(xi,xi′) =
∂
∂xi Z˜(xi′) > 0. This entails that a
necessary condition for the sum of utilities to be maximal by some network µ is that for any two agents
i′, j′ such that xi′ > x j′ it holds that dδi′ (µ)> d
δ
j (µ). The necessity is demonstrated in the following.
Denote an alternative network µ˜ where i′ and j′ have switched positions: if i′ and j′ are not linked in µ
then let νi(µ˜) = νi′(µ) and νi′(µ˜) = νi(µ); else if i′ and j′ are linked in µ then let νi(µ˜) = νi′(µ)∪{i′}/{i}
and νi′(µ˜) = νi(µ)∪{i}/{i′}. Thus it holds that dδj (µ˜) = dδi (µ) and dδi (µ˜) = dδj (µ). A deviation from
µ to µ˜ is possible for the grand coalition.
We will show that the alternative network µ˜ will generate higher aggregate utility which violates
efficiency of µ and thus also violates strong stability. Starting with costs there are two cases of cost
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technology: when there is quota in links then a deviation to the alternative network µ˜ is consistent with
the degree quota18 and has unchanged costs; when there are convex costs then the move will have no
change in aggregate costs as the sum of costs for agents i and j is unchanged. However, the benefits will
be higher under µ˜ , using that i and i switch neighborhoods - this follows as dδj (µ)> dδi (µ) is equivalent
to:
dδj (µ) · [Z˜(xi)− Z˜(x j)] > dδi (µ) · [Z˜(xi)− Z˜(x j)],
dδi (µ˜) · Z˜(xi)+dδj (µ˜) · Z˜(x j) > dδi (µ) · Z˜(xi)+dδj (µ) · Z˜(x j),
∑
i∈N
bi(µ˜) > ∑
i∈N
bi(µ).
Appendix B.5. Limits to sorting and monotonic centrality
Example 3. This example shows how monotonic δ -decay centrality can fail when there is supermodular-
ity. The stability concept is strong stability.
Suppose there are seven agents - three of high type (1-3) and four of low type (4-7). There is su-
permodularity; a degree quota of two, and; a level of network externalities δ . Consider the segregated
network µ = {12,23,31}∪{45,56,67,74}, and the connected network µ˜ = {12,23,34,45,56,67,71}. If
the inequality below holds with ”>” then µ is an efficient network; if ”<” then µ˜ is an efficient network.
3 ·Z(x¯, x¯)+4 ·Z(
¯
x,
¯
x)T 2 ·Z(x¯, x¯)+3 ·Z(
¯
x,
¯
x)+(2+4δ +6δ 2) ·Z(x¯,
¯
x). (B.23)
When Inequality B.23 holds with ”>” then µ is furthermore strongly stable when for every pair of agents
i, j ∈ N; i 6= j it holds that there are no transfers between them, i.e. τi j = 0. In the network µ it holds
that dδi (µ) > dδj (µ) where i ∈ {1,2,3,4}, j ∈ {5,6,7}. Note that Inequality B.23 holds with ”>” if
Zˆ > 1+2δ +3δ 2 and Zˆ > 1 due to supermodularity.
Lemma 3. In Example 2 the sufficient conditions for existence of τ such that µ is stable are linear costs
18Both agents have a number of links that do not exceed the degree quota in the original network - thus their degree quota
cannot be exceed in the alternative network.
5
6 7 1
2 3
4
Figure B.4: Failing monotonic centrality. The above networks depict failure of monotonic centrality in the presence of super-
modularity (i.e. no absence of modularity) from Example 3.
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(c˜ of forming a link) and δ being sufficiently high along with the two inequalities:
2 ·Z(x¯,
¯
x)+Z(x¯, x¯)≥ 4c˜ and Z(x¯,
¯
x)> c˜.
Proof. Linear cost entails that c(2) = 2c(1). Note that the total cost of establishing a link is 2c˜. Through-
out we assume symmetry such that s1 = s2 and τ12 = 0 which implies τ31 = τ32. To shorten notation let
si = si(µ,τ).
We begin with deriving the required transfers and net utility for the low type, i.e. agent 3, the relevant
Inequalities are 4, 5, 8. The two inequalities (for i = 1,2) in Inequality 5 can be rewritten using that
τ31 = τ32:
τ31 ≥ c˜− z(¯x, x¯),
τ31+ τ32 ≥ 2c˜−2z(¯x, x¯),
2c˜−2z(
¯
x, x¯)+ s3 ≥ 2c˜−2z(¯x, x¯),
s3 ≥ 0. (B.24)
Thus Inequality 5 is irrelevant when τ12 = τ13 and Inequality 4 (s3 ≥ 0) is satisfied.
By adding the two inequalities in Inequality 8 where i = 3 and j = 1,2 together and using non-
wastefulness (Σi∈Nsi(µ,τ) =U(µ)) the following must hold for the net utility of agent 3:
s3 ≥ 2Z(x¯, ¯x)−4c˜− [δZ(x¯, x¯)+2Z(x¯, ¯x)−4c˜],
s3 ≥ −δZ(x¯, x¯). (B.25)
We see that Inequality B.25 is satisfied when Inequality 4 holds (s3 ≥ 0). Note that the two inequalities
in Inequality 8 where i = 3 and j = 1,2 must still hold.
We now turn to derive to check relevant transfer and net utilities for agent 1 and 2. The relevant
expressions are Inequalities 4, 6, 7 and 8. For large enough δ (i.e. δ → 1) then it always holds that
Inequality 6 is satisfied; thus it suffices to check Inequalities 4, 7 and 8.
We use a similar procedure to see the implication on net utility of agent i ∈ {1,2}. Let j = {1,2}\{i}.
By adding the two inequalities from Inequality 8 for the pair of 3, i and the pair i, j, together and using
non-wastefulness (Σi∈Nsi(µ,τ) =U(µ)) it must hold that:
min{s1,s2} ≥ Z(x¯, ¯x)+Z(x¯, x¯)−4c˜− [δZ(x¯, x¯)+2Z(x¯, ¯x)−4c˜],
min{s1,s2} ≥ (1−δ )Z(x¯, x¯)−Z(x¯, ¯x). (B.26)
For sufficiently large δ then Inequality B.26 becomes irrelevant as in the limit of δ → 1 its requirement
is min{s1,s2}≥−Z(x¯, ¯x)which is always satisfied when min{s1,s2}≥ 0. Note that it still remains to check
all three conditions from Inequality 8 are valid.
In addition, it is possible to rewrite Inequality 7 in to Inequality B.27. Note that Inequality B.27 is a
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sufficient condition for Inequality B.27 for both agent 1 and 2.
s1+ s2 ≥ Z(x¯, x¯)+(1+δ )z(x¯, ¯x)+max{τ12,τ13}−3c˜,
s1+ s2 ≥ Z(x¯, x¯)+(1+δ )z(x¯, ¯x)+max{s1,s2}−δ z(x¯, x¯)− z(x¯, ¯x)−2c˜,
min{s1,s2} ≥ (2−δ )z(x¯, x¯)+δ z(x¯, ¯x)−2c˜. (B.27)
In the remainder of this proof we restrict that s3 = 0 and thus τ12 = τ13 = z(¯
x, x¯)− c˜. This restriction
ensures the minimal requirements for the transfer and net utility for agent 3 are met (see Inequalities 4, 5,
8). This restriction allows us to assess when the remaining requirements are satisfied for agents 1 and 2
given that the requirements for agent are minimally satisfied. When s3 = 0 then Inequality 8 is satisfied if:
min{s1,s2} ≥ Z(x¯, ¯x)−2c˜. (B.28)
It is possible to further restrict sufficient conditions for when the remaining relevant inequalities are
satisfied when s1 = s2 and s3 = 0. Recall that it is necessary to check Inequalities 4, 7 and 8 for large
enough δ . The sufficient condition for the inequalities is captured in Inequality B.29 below. The elements
in the set from which the maximal element is chosen derived from respectively: Inequality 4; Inequality
B.27 which implies Inequality 7 is satisfied; Inequality 8 for the pair 1,2; Inequality B.28 which implies
Inequality 8 for the pair 1,3 and the pair 2,3.
s1+ s2 ≥ max{0, 2(2−δ )z(x¯, x¯)+2δ z(x¯, ¯x)−4c˜, Z(x¯, x¯)−2c˜, 2Z(x¯, ¯x)−4c˜}. (B.29)
Using that s3 = 0 it holds that s1 + s2 = s1 + s2 + s3. Combining non-wastefulness (Σi∈Nsi(µ,τ) =
U(µ)) with Inequality B.29 we can derive the following four inequalities - each inequality correspond to
an n’th element in the set from which the maximal element is chosen.
2Z(x¯,
¯
x)+δZ(x¯, x¯)−4c˜ ≥ 0, (B.30)
2Z(x¯,
¯
x)+δZ(x¯, x¯)−4c˜ ≥ 2(2−δ )z(x¯, x¯)+2δ z(x¯,
¯
x)−4c˜,
2 · (
¯
x, x¯)+2(1−δ )(x¯,
¯
x) ≥ 2(1−δ )Z(x¯, x¯), (B.31)
2Z(x¯,
¯
x)+δZ(x¯, x¯)−4c˜ ≥ Z(x¯, x¯)−2c˜,
2Z(x¯,
¯
x) ≥ (1−δ )Z(x¯, x¯)+2c˜, (B.32)
2Z(x¯,
¯
x)+δZ(x¯, x¯)−4c˜ ≥ 2Z(x¯,
¯
x)−4c˜,
(1−δ )Z(x¯, x¯) ≥ 0. (B.33)
Of the above we see that Inequality B.31 holds when δ is large enough while Inequality B.33 always
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holds. Thus all the above inequalities can be satisfied for large enough δ when 2Z(x¯,
¯
x)+ δZ(x¯, x¯) ≥ 4c˜
and Z(x¯,
¯
x)> c˜.
In what follows we demonstrate two auxiliary results: Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. These two results
imply Corollary 1 and 2. The first auxiliary lemma rely on Condition 1 below; this condition is a general-
ization of the conditions from Example 2.
Condition 1. Let µ = ∪i∈1,..,n−1{in}; transfers are restricted as follows:
Σi∈Nsi = U(µ)
= Σi∈{1,..,n−1}Zin+Σi, j∈{1,..,n−1},i> jδZi j− (n−1) · c(1)− c(n−1), (B.34)
along with the following three set of inequalities,
∀i ∈ N : si ≥ 0, (B.35)
∀i 6= n : τni ≥ c(n−1)− c(n−2)− zni, (B.36)
∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j : si+ s j ≥ Zi j−2 · c(1). (B.37)
and finally the following two set of inequalities must hold for any two i, j ∈ (N\{n}), i 6= j:
si+ s j ≥ Zi j + zin+δ z jn+δΣl /∈{i, j,n}[zil +δ z jl]− c(1)− c(2)+ τin, (B.38)
2 · [c(2)− c(1)] ≥ (1−δ ) ·Zi j. (B.39)
Lemma 4. Suppose there are at least three agents (n ≥ 3), weak supermodularity and monotonicity, a
cost function and an interval [δ˜ , δˆ ] where all inequalities from Condition 1 are satisfied, then for every
δ ∈ [δ˜ , δˆ ] the low value sponsored star is pairwise stable.
Proof. The network µ be a low value sponsored star with agent n as center, i.e. µ = ∪i∈1,..,n−1{in}. We
show that µ is pairwise stable if the relevant conditions are met.
First we check for deviations from µ where an agent deletes all its links in µ . This move cannot be
profitable when Inequality B.35 is satisfied for all individuals. This implies for any agent but agent n it is
not profitable to delete their single link in µ . Furthermore for agent n deleting any link is not profitable
due to due to Inequality B.36 being satisfied. This also implies that deleting any number of links for agent
n is not beneficial as each is beneficial at the highest marginal cost.
Second network µ is robust to deviations where two agents delete all links and form a single link as
any two agents can only gain less by such a move cf. Inequality B.37.
Finally the network µ is robust to deviation where a link is formed by two agents of which one agent
deletes its link to n but another agent keeps its link to agent n when Inequality B.38 is satisfied. The
network µ is robust to deviations where both agents keep their current link with agent n and form a new
link together if Inequality B.39 is satisfied.
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Lemma 5. Sufficient conditions for a low value sponsored star, with agent n as center, to be stable are:
linear linking costs; many agents; δ ∈ [1− 2c˜/Z(x1,x2),1); transfers s.t. sn ≥ 0 and
si ≥ max
j/∈{i,n}
[
(1−δ 2)Zi j− (δ −δ 2)z ji
]
+δ zin+δ 2Σι /∈{i,n}ziι −2c˜, i 6= n.
Proof. The setting is as specified by Lemma 4 where costs are linear such that total costs are c(k) = k · c˜.
Note the total cost of establishing a link then is 2c˜ as two agents are required. We use a procedure similar
to the one for Lemma 3 to find the restrictions on net utility for agents. We first investigate restrictions for
agent n and then the remaining agents.
We examine the implication for the lower bound on net-utility for agent n from the n-1 inequalities for
agent n with the other agents in Inequality B.36 by summing over the inequalities:
Σi 6=nτni ≥ (n−1)c˜−Σi 6=nzni,
sn ≥ 0, (B.40)
Thus if the n−1 conditions from Inequality B.36 hold it is a sufficient condition for Inequality B.35
also to hold for agent n; thus we only require that τni ≥ c˜− z(¯x,xi) for agent i 6= n.
We analogously examine the implication of the other n− 1 inequalities in Inequality B.37 for agent
n’s lower bound on net-utility by summing and subtracting Equation B.34:
sn ≥ −δ · (Σi, j∈{1,..,n−1},i> jZi j). (B.41)
The above inequality is less strict than Inequality B.35 thus without implication on agent n.
We now investigate restrictions for other agents. By summing over Inequality B.37 for agent i ∈
{1, ..,n−1} with other agents and subtracting Equation B.34 we get:
si · (n−2) ≥ Σ j/∈{i,n}Zi j−Σ j/∈{i,n}Z jn−δΣi, j∈{1,..,n−1},i> jZi j.
Due to monotonicity it holds that we can bound link value for any i, j : Z(x¯, x¯) ≥ Zi j ≥ Z(¯x, ¯x). A
sufficient condition for the above inequality is:
si ≥ (n−1) ·Z(x¯, x¯)− [(n−1)+δ (n−2)
2] ·Z(
¯
x,
¯
x)
n−2 .
For δ > 0 and sufficiently many agents (as n→∈ f ty) then the above inequality is irrelevant as the
right hand side is negative for i 6= n; thus Inequality B.37 will not be binding a constraint.
In addition, for any two agents i, j 6= 1 it is possible to rewrite Inequality B.38 in to the following
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(using that τi j = 0 when i, j 6= n):
si+ s j ≥ Zi j + z jn+δ zin+Σι /∈{i, j,n}[δ z jι +δ 2ziι ]−3c˜+ τ jn,
si+ s j ≥ Zi j +δ zin+Σι /∈{i, j,n}δ 2ziι −2c˜−δ z ji+ s j,
si ≥ zi j +(1−δ )z ji+δ zin+Σι /∈{i, j,n}δ 2ziι −2c˜. (B.42)
The maximum of Inequality B.42 for agent i is:
si ≥ max
j/∈{i,n}
[
zi j +(1−δ )z ji+δ zin+δ 2Σι /∈{i, j,n}ziι
]−2c˜,
si ≥ max
j/∈{i,n}
[
(1−δ 2)zi j +(1−δ )z ji
]
+δ zin+δ 2Σι /∈{i,n}ziι −2c˜,
si ≥ max
j/∈{i,n}
[
(1−δ 2)Zi j− (δ −δ 2)z ji
]
+δ zin+δ 2Σι /∈{i,n}ziι −2c˜.
The above inequality can be satisfied for all agents apart excluding agent n when:
Σi∈{1,..,n−1}si ≥ Σi∈{1,..,n−1}[(1−δ 2)Zi1− (δ −δ 2)z1i+δ zin]+
Σi, j∈{1,..,n−1},i> jδ 2Zi j− (2n−2)c˜. (B.43)
We check validity of Inequality B.43 using non-wastefulness in Equation B.34:
sn = Σi∈{1,..,n}si−Σi∈{1,..,n−1}si
≤ Σi∈{1,..,n−1}Zin+Σi, j∈{1,..,n−1},i> jδZi j− (n−1) · c(1)− c(n−1),
−[Σi∈{1,..,n−1}[(1−δ 2)Zi1− (δ −δ 2)z1i+δ zin]+Σi, j∈{1,..,n−1},i> jδ 2Zi j− (2n−2)c˜],
= Σi∈{1,..,n−1}[(1−δ )Zin− (1−δ 2)Zi1+(δ −δ 2)z1i+δ zni]+Σi, j∈{1,..,n−1},i> j(δ −δ 2)Zi j,
= (1−δ )U(µ)−Σi∈{1,..,n−1}[(1−δ 2)Zi1− (δ −δ 2)z1i−δ zni].
For many agents it must be that (1−δ )U(µ)≥ Σi∈{1,..,n−1}[(1−δ 2)Zi1− (δ −δ 2)z1i−δ zni] as U(µ)
is quadratic in size while the right hand side is linear. Thus sn ≥ 0 can be satisfied for large populations
along with the conditions for other agents.
Finally we see that Inequality B.39 is satisfied for all agents when:
2c˜ ≥ (1−δ ) ·Z(x1,x2),
2c˜/Z(x1,x2) ≥ (1−δ ),
δ ≥ 1− 2c˜/Z(x1,x2).
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Appendix C. Supplementary appendix: Suboptimal sorting for constant decay
This appendix shows a how suboptimally sorted networks are also prevalent under constant decay. It
is split into two sub-appendices: sub-appendix Appendix C.1 which deals with demonstrating the results
and sub-appendix Appendix C.2 which only contains auxiliary results.
Appendix C.1. Suboptimal sorting in local trees
We show sorting may be pairwise stable but suboptimal under constant decay for a subclass of net-
works. We begin by describing this subclass. Informally put, the relevant subclass of perfectly sorted
networks where each subnetwork for a given type has a certain structure. The structure of each subnet-
work is such that from the perspective of every agent (i.e. the ego-network) each subnetwork appears as a
tree when disregarding the links of the agents furthest away. Note that a tree is network where every pair
of agents are connected by a unique path. Thus these subnetworks are called local trees as they are not
trees in a global sense but only when disregarding most distant agents.
The formal definition is as described below. The definition employs the network diameter which is
the maximum distance between any two agents, i.e. m(µ) = supi, j∈N pi j(µ).
Definition 11. A network µ is a local tree when each agent i has κ links where:
• for each other agent j 6= i at distance pi j(µ)≤ mn,κ −2 there are κ−1 links between agent j and
j′ such that j′ is one step further away, i.e. pi j(µ) = pi j′(µ)−1;
• the network diameter m(µ) = mn,κ ,
mn,κ = argmin
m
{m : Σml=1(κ(κ−1)l−1)+1≥ n}. (C.1)
The structure of local trees entails that each agent has κ · (κ−1)p−1 agents at distance p < m, where
m = mn,κ . At distance p = m there are n−∑m−1l=1 κ · (κ − 1)l−1 (all remaining agents). This structure
implies that every agent’s utility is maximized subject to the constraint of all agents having at most κ
links;19 a side effect is that utility before transfers is symmetric.
A necessary condition for local trees to exist is that there is no link surplus, i.e. degree quota is binding
(∀i ∈ N : ki = κ). Note this binding condition is only possible when n ·κ is even.
When a local tree network fulfills n=∑ml=1κ ·(κ−1)l−1 then it is an exact local tree. See the next sub-
appendix for an elaborate treatment of structure of exactly local trees. Two subclasses of exact local trees
which are worth mentioning. The first is a network known as a cycle or a ring. The cycle is characterized
by having a minimal possible degree quota (κ = 2) among local trees and a maximal diameter (m =⌈n−1
2
⌉
). The second is a clique where all agents are linked, i.e. the complete network. Cliques have
maximal degree quotas (κ = n−1) and minimal diameters (m= 1). Both subclasses has a network which
19The maximization of utility follows from the observation that each agent has at most κ links, so at distance p there can be at
most κ · (κ−1)p−1 agents.
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exists for any n. Note that in Example 1 each of the two components is both a cycle and a clique. Note
that there exist non-trivial networks beyond the cycle and the clique.20
In order to derive our results it is necessary to restrict ourselves to a subset of local trees. The subset
are those local trees where the deletion of links leads to equal losses to both of agents whose link is
deleted; thus we refer to these local trees as having symmetric losses:
Definition 12. A local tree µ has symmetric losses when at every distance p = 1, ..,m it holds that |{i ∈
N : pι i(µ\{ιι ′}) = p}|= |{i ∈ N : pι ′i(µ\{ιι ′}) = p}|.
Denote the set of perfectly sorted networks where the subnetwork for each type is a local tree with
symmetric losses as Mp−srt:symm. loc−tree.
Whether or not symmetric losses is a generic property for all local trees is an open question. However,
in simulations that we perform it holds all network configurations which are local trees up to size n = 10
have symmetric losses (see result below and proof for exhibition of examples). Moreover for size up to
n = 16 it has been shown to hold for any networks examined in the simulation.
A generalization of stable but suboptimal sorting under constant decay is expressed below. While
allowing for constant decay rather than hyperbolic it the set of networks are further restricted.
Theorem 2. Suppose there is supermodularity, a degree quota κ and each type has equal number of
agents then
(i) Mˆ∩MmaxUδ>
¯
δ = /0;
(ii) Mˆ ⊆Mp−stbδ≤δ¯ ;
where Mˆ = Mp−srt:symm. loc−tree and thresholds
¯
δ , δ¯ ∈ (0,1) where
¯
δ < δ¯
Proof. We show properties (i) and (ii) together. Let µ be a network which is segregated into |X | com-
ponents where each component is a local tree with n/|X | agents. Let there be no transfers between any
agents.
As each subnetwork for a given type is a local tree it is stable against deviations by agents of the
same type - this follows as local trees provides maximal possible benefits among feasible structures of the
subnetwork for all agents in the subnetwork. Thus only two agents of different types may have a profitable
deviation which is feasible.
Let ι , j be agents of respectively types x and x˜. These two agents can deviate by each deleting a link
to ι ′ and j′ respectively while jointly forming a link. The new network resulting from deletion is denoted
µˆ = µ\{ιι ′, j j′}. The move resulting from deletion and forming a link is denoted µ˘ = µˆ ∪{ι j}. An
alternative network is µ˜ , the type-bridged network of µ , where the links ιι ′, j j′ are removed while the
links ι j, ι ′, j′ have been formed; thus µ˜ = µˆ ∪{ι j, ι ′ j′}.
20An example is {i1i2, i1i3, i1i4, i2i5, i2i6, i3i7, i3i8, i4i9, i4i10, i5i7, i5i9, i6i8, i6i10, i7i9, i8i10} when n = 10,κ = 3.
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Define the gross loss of benefits for i as ui(µˆ)−ui(µ) while the gross gains are ui(µ˜)−ui(µˆ). There
must exist a threshold of externalities δ¯ ∈ (0,1) where µ is no longer pairwise stable as cost of deviation
monotonically decreases and approaches zero as δ → 1 while gains are monotonically increasing. The
monotonicity of losses is a consequence of the fact that gross loss consists of shortest paths from µ , where
ιι ′ is included in the shortest path, which have longer length in µˆ and thus are discounted more. Therefore
the gross loss is mitigated by a higher δ as the longer shortest paths are punished less. The monotonicity
of gains follows as the gains consist of new shortest paths to agents of type x˜ through ι j and j′ι ′ the value
of these increases for higher δ .
Exploiting the that Fact 2 and 3 from Appendix Appendix C.2 hold for local trees it follows that for
any other agent i of type x (i.e. i is in N\{ι , ι ′} and xi = x):
ui(µ˜)−ui(µ)> δmin(piι (µ˜),piι ′ (µ˜))[uι(µ˘)−uι(µ)].
Aggregating for all agents this implies:
U(µ˜)−U(µ) > [uι(µ˘)−uι(µ)] · ∑
xi=x
δmin(piι (µ˜),piι ′ (µ˜))+[u j(µ˘)−u j(µ)] · ∑
x′i=x˜
δmin(pi j(µ),pi j′ (µ)).
where m = mn,κ . The inequality above implies the following: if U(µ˜)−U(µ) = 0 then uι(µ˘)−
uι(µ)+ u j(µ˘)− u j(µ) < 0; U(µ˜)−U(µ) > 0 when uι(µ˘)− uι(µ)+ u j(µ˘)− u j(µ) = 0. It can also be
argued that there must exist a threshold,
¯
δ , such that when δ =
¯
δ then U(µ˜)−U(µ) = 0 and that
¯
δ < δ¯ .
This follows as U(µ˜)−U(µ)< 0 for δ = 0 and U(µ˜)−U(µ)> 0 when uι(µ˜)−uι(µ)+u j(µ˜)−u j(µ)= 0
as well as continuity of U(µ˜)−U(µ) in δ .
This entails that for δ >
¯
δ then µ˜ provide higher aggregate payoff. Moreover we showed previously
that for δ < δ¯ then µ is pairwise (Nash) stable. Thus we have proven properties (i) and (ii).
For constant decay the thresholds governing when sorting is respectively suboptimal and stable, i.e.
¯
δ , δ¯ , can be determined explicitly by solving polynomial equations for every deviation. Moreover, for
exact local trees there is a unique solution. In Figure C.5 the two thresholds from Theorem 2,
¯
δ (Zˆ), δ¯ (Zˆ).
The plots in Figure C.5 are made for variations of exact local trees. The upper plots corresponds to
cliques with various sizes. The lower plot have fixed degree quota (κ=100) and the threshold is simulated
using pattern in utility that is demonstrated in Appendix Appendix C.2. The plots show the scope for
inefficiency, i.e. the gap between
¯
δ (Zˆ), δ¯ (Zˆ), increases with the number of agents involved. This makes
sense intuitively as the two agents forming the link will fail to account for an increasing number of indirect
connections between the two groups. As the number of indirect connections increases at with the squared
with total number of agents then larger populations will lead to larger gaps of inefficiency.
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Figure C.5: Visualization of thresholds for connecting from Theorem 2. The upper diagrams correspond to cliques and the lower
ones to exact local trees (where thresholds stem from Equations C.4, C.5, C.10, C.11).
Appendix C.2. Local trees
This sub-appendix provides auxiliary results for deriving the generalization of suboptimal sorting. We
begin our focus on exact local trees and subsequently more generally in local tree networks, see Definition
11 in the previous sub-appendix.
We will examine a generic network µ which is perfectly sorted and assume that the subset of links for
each type is a component that can be classified as either a local tree or an exact local tree. Let networks
µx and µx˜ be the components associated with respectively types x, x˜ ∈ X . We will focus on three particular
moves:
• Pairwise deletion of a link: Suppose two links ιι ′, j j′ ∈ µ are deleted and agents ι and j have
respectively type x and x˜; thus the two links are not from the same component. Let the new network
that results from removal of the links be denoted µˆ = µ\{ιι ′, j j′}.
• Pairwise formation of a link across types: This move presumes that both agents are also deleting a
link. We denote this as a move where agents ι and j form a link: µ˘ = µˆ ∪ {ι j}.
• Double pairwise formation of a link across types: When two links are formed across types in µ this
corresponds to a non-pairwise deviation as it requires four coalition members. We denote this as a
move where both agents ι and j as well as ι ′ and j′ form a link: µ˜ = µˆ ∪ {ι j, ι ′ j′}.
Finally let i denote a generic agent of type x. Let the shortest path in µ from i to either ι or ι ′ be
denoted pˆi where pˆi = min(piι(µˆ), piι ′(µˆ)). When pˆi = 0 then either i = ι or i = ι ′.
Basic properties. We exploit that µ is a local tree (see Definition 11). Throughout the remainder of the
paper let m = mn,κ (see Equation C.1). We express each agent’s number of paths of length p as a function
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of the number of agents and the degree quota:
#pi (µ) = κ(κ−1)p−1−1=m(p) ·∆#(n,κ), ∆#(n,κ) =
m
∑
l=1
(κ · (κ−1)l−1)−n, (C.2)
where 1=m(p) is the Dirac measure of whether p = m. Using the local tree structure we can express
utility without transfers of each agent:
ui(µ) =
m
∑
l=1
#li(µ) ·δ l · z(x,x).
Exact local trees
Recall exact local trees are local trees where ∆#(n,κ) = 0. We will argue that this entails that exact
local trees have the essential property that for every pair of agents there is a unique shortest path of at most
length m and the number of paths for every agent is prescribed by Equation C.2. This can be deducted as
follows.
Note first that the fact that the number of walks with at most length m starting in a given agent i cannot
exceed ∑mp=1 #
p
i (·). Recall also that local trees has the property that all agents are reached within distance
m. Moreover exact local trees has the property that for any agent i it holds that n−1 = ∑mp=1 #pi (µ); thus
every shortest path with distances less than or equal to m must be a unique path between the two particular
agents.
The uniqueness and countability of paths can be used to infer the losses when links are either removed
or added to an exact local tree.
Exact local trees - loss from deletion. In order to examine the impact of deletion of a link it is sufficient to
analyze what happens to one component of types. This is sufficient as other components as the conclusions
are valid for all.
The deletion of link ιι ′ implies that any pair of agents i, i′ whose (unique) shortest path in µ includes
the link ιι ′ will have a new shortest routing path. For exact local trees we can exactly determine the length
of the new path. Let i be the agent whose distance to ι is least and let i′ be the agent whose distance to ι ′
is least, i.e. piι(µ)< piι ′(µ) and pi′ι ′(µ)< pi′ι(µ).
First when link ιι ′ is deleted we can show there is no shortest path between i and i′ in µˆ with length
below 2m− pˆi− pˆi′ ; that is there is no ii′ whose shortest path in µ includes ιι ′ such that pii′(µˆ) < 2m−
pˆi− pˆi′ . Suppose this was not true. Then there would exist an agent j who (1) is on the new shortest path
between i and i′ in µˆ and (2) whose shortest path to agents ι and ι ′ does not include the link ιι ′ and (3)
such that
p ji(µˆ)+ p ji′(µˆ) < 2m− pˆi− pˆi′ ,
p ji(µˆ)+ p ji′(µˆ) < 2m−min(piι(µ), piι ′(µ))−min(pi′ι(µ), pi′ι ′(µ)).
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As by construction piι(µ)< piι ′(µ) and pi′ι ′(µ)< pi′ι(µ) then the expression above is equivalent to:
p ji(µˆ)+ p ji′(µˆ)< 2m− piι(µ)− pi′ι ′(µ). As the shortest path between i and ι as well as between i′ and
ι ′ are unchanged from µ to µˆ it follows that we can further rewrite into:
p ji(µˆ)+ p ji′(µˆ)< 2m− piι(µˆ)− pi′ι ′(µˆ)
However, the above statement implies that in network µ that either ι or ι ′ has two paths with lengths
of at most m but this violates the definition of exact local trees.
We can now show that when link ιι ′ is deleted the new shortest path between i and i′ in µˆ has a length
of exactly 2m− pˆi− pˆi′ . This is shown by demonstrating there is an agent j such that p ji(µˆ) = m− pˆi and
p ji′(µˆ) = m− pˆi′ . This can be shown follows. Suppose that p ji(µˆ) = m− pˆi. We will demonstrate that
p ji′(µˆ) = m− pˆi′ . As p ji(µˆ) = m− pˆi it follows that p jι(µˆ) = m. From the definition of exact local trees
there must exist a path of length less than m between j and ι ′ in network µ . As argued in the paragraph
above neither of these paths can be strictly shorter than m and consequently they must both be exactly m.
The number of shortest paths of length p which become altered for agent i is (κ − 1)p−pˆi−1 for p =
pˆi, ..,m− 2,m− 1. This can be demonstrated as follows. If agent piι(µ) = m and piι ′(µ) = m then no
shortest paths are altered; this is clear as agent i as none of the unique shortest paths includes ιι ′ as they
have at most length m. If instead piι(µ) = m−1 then the unique shortest path from i to ι ′ includes ιι ′ is
the last link; this implies a new shortest path if ιι ′ is deleted. Thus if piι(µ) = m− 1 then one shortest
path of length m is lost. When piι(µ) = m−2 then one path of length m−1 is lost by the same argument;
moreover κ − 1 paths that has ιι ′ as the second last link. By induction this can be done at higher order
and thus for shorter distances. Using the number of rerouted paths shown above we can establish the total
number of shortest paths in network µˆ for agent i that has a length of p:
#pi (µˆ) =
κ(κ−1)p−1−1>pˆi(p) · (κ−1)p−pˆi−1, p≤ m(κ−1)2m−pˆi−p, p ∈ (m,2m− pˆi]. (C.3)
By combining the count of shortest paths rerouted with their new length we can generalize the loss for
any agent from the deletion of link ιι ′ when all agents are homogeneous of type x:
ui(µ)−ui(µˆ) =
m−pˆi
∑
l=1
[
(κ−1)l−1 ·
(
δ l−1+pˆi−δ 2m−(l−1)−pˆi
)]
· z(x,x). (C.4)
We can aggregate the losses across homogeneous agents of type x and we arrive at the following
expression:
U(µ)−U(µˆ) =
m
∑
l=1
[
2l · (κ−1)l−1 ·
(
δ l−1−δ 2m−(l−1)
)]
· z(x,x). (C.5)
Exact local trees - gains from linking across types. We move on to establishing the gains of establishing
a link in a perfectly sorted network where each component is an exact local tree.
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The gains to agents ι and j of forming a link ι j are direct benefits and the new indirect connections
that are accessed through the link ι j. For agent ι the benefits from forming a link with j can be computed
with Equation C.3 where the input length is added one (as ι j is added to the shortest path). Recall
µ˘ = µ ∪{ι j}\{ιι ′, j j′}.
uι(µ˘)−uι(µ) =
[
m
∑
l=0
(κ−1)l ·δ l +
m−1
∑
l=0
(κ−1)l ·δ 2m−l
]
· z(x, x˜). (C.6)
The above expression is relevant for evaluating the pairwise gains as it captures individual benefits for
a pairwise formation of a link by ι and j. However, we are also interested in the sub-connected network
as it allows to assess the efficiency. Suppose instead now that ι ′ and j′ also form a link; thus ι j, ι ′ j′ are
formed while ιι ′, j j′ are deleted. Let µ˜ = µ ∪{ι j, ι ′ j′}\{ιι ′, j j′}.
Let i be an agent of type x and let pˆi still denote the least distance to either ι or ι ′. We can calculate
the benefits for i when ι j, ι ′ j′ are formed. The benefits are the indirect connections to agents of type x˜
with whom agent i has no connections in µ . The aim is to count the number of paths of a given length.
For a given agent i′ of the other type x˜ it must hold that the shortest path in µ˜ between i, i′ either
contains the link ι j or the link ι ′ j′, and thus the distance can be computed as follows:
pii′(µ˜) = min[pi j(µ˜)+ pi′ j(µ˜), pi j′(µ˜)+ pi′ j′(µ˜)] (C.7)
We further restrict the above expression. We can use that i and i′ of type x˜ can be at most 2m+1 away
from each other. This follows from the fact that piι(µ˜)+ piι ′(µ˜) = 2m and pi′ j(µ˜)+ pi′ j′(µ˜) = 2m. As
piι(µ˜)+ piι ′(µ˜) = 2m and ι j, ι ′ j′ ∈ µ˜ then it must be that pi j + pi j′ = 2m+2. These facts together entail
we can rewrite Equation C.7:
pii′(µ˜) = min[pi j(µ˜)+ pi′ j(µ˜), pi j′(µ˜)+ pi′ j′(µ˜)]
= min[pi j(µ˜)+ pi′ j(µ˜), 4m+2− pi j(µ˜)− pi′ j(µ˜)]. (C.8)
From the above expression it follows that pii′ ≤ 2m+1 as the expression is maximized for pi j+ pi′ j =
2m+1.
The number of shortest paths from i through ι j to agents of the other type x˜ can be found using
Equation C.3 for agent ι adding extra distance 1+ pˆi:21
• for distance p ∈ {1+ pˆi, ...,m+1+ pˆi} there are (κ−1)p−1−pˆi agents;
• for distance p ∈ {m+2+ pˆi, ..., 2m+1} there are (κ−1)2m+1−(p−1−pˆi).
The shortest paths from i not routed through ι but instead through ι ′ are those where p+1+ pˆi > 2m+1;
21Shortest paths from i must contain both ι j and every link in the shortest path from i to j.
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from Equation C.8 we know the new shortest path length is 4m+2− p−1− pˆi. The number of shortest
paths through ι ′ in network µ˜ will be (κ−1)2m+1−(p−1−pˆi) and the new length 4m+2− p−1− pˆi. These
facts together imply:
#pi (µ˜)−#pi (µˆ) =

(κ−1)p−1−pˆi , p ∈ { pˆi +1, ..,m+1+ pˆi},
(κ−1)2m+1−p−pˆi , p ∈ {m+ pˆi +2, ..,2m+1},
(κ−1)p+pˆi−2m−1, p ∈ {2m+1− pˆi, ..,2m}.
(C.9)
From the number of paths above we can derive the change in utility from when ι j, ι ′ j′ are added to
the network for a given agent i of type x.
ui(µ˜)−ui(µˆ) =
 ∑
m
l=0(κ−1)l ·δ l+pˆi
+ ∑m−1l=pˆi (κ−1)l ·δ 2m−l+pˆi
+ ∑pˆi−1l=0 (κ−1)l ·δ 2m+l−pˆi
 · z(x, x˜). (C.10)
By aggregating over all agents of type the gain in benefits by forming ι j, ι ′ j′ is as follows:
U(µ˜)−U(µˆ) =
m
∑
p=0
[ 1<m(p) ·2 · (κ−1)p+
1=m(p) · (n−2 ·∑m−1l=1 (κ−1)l)
]
·
 ∑
m
l=0(κ−1)l ·δ l+p
+ ∑m−1l=p (κ−1)l ·δ 2m−l+p
+ ∑p−1l=0 (κ−1)l ·δ 2m+l−p

 ·Z(x, x˜). (C.11)
Local trees
We can use the analysis above on exact local trees to bound the gains and losses for (non-exact)
local trees. Recall that exact local trees has the property that ∆#(n,κ) = 0 and for non-exact local trees
∆#(n,κ) > 0. Thus the difference between exact and non-exact local trees is that for a given agent the
number of connected other agents at exactly distance m is lower for non-exact local trees.
Using the analysis of exact local trees we can compute the bounds on loss of utility for a given agent
in the local when a link is deleted - this is done by reusing Equation C.3 as follows.
We can discount the number of agents initially at distance m by ∆#(n,κ). Moreover, the new distance
between agents i and i′ after deletion of the link ιι ′ is at least min(pii′ ,2m− 2− pˆi− pˆi′) at most 2m−
pˆi− pˆi′ .22 From these two facts we can derive the bound on loss of utility when ιι ′ is deleted. The upper
bound on loss (in terms of magnitude) is when new shortest paths have most distance, i.e. 2m− pˆi− pˆi′ ;
the lower bound is found when new distance is least, i.e. min(pii′ ,2m−2− pˆi− pˆi′):
ui(µ)−ui(µˆ) ≤
m−pˆi
∑
l=1
[
max(0,(κ−1)l−1−1=m(l) ·∆#(n,κ))
(
δ l−1+pˆi −δ 2m−(l−1)−pˆi
)]
· z(x,x), (C.12)
ui(µ)−ui(µˆ) ≥
m˜
∑
l=1
[
(κ−1)l−1 ·
(
δ l−1+pˆi −δ 2m−(l+1)−pˆi
)]
· z(x,x), m˜ = min(m−1,m− pˆi). (C.13)
22The upper bound follows from the fact that for any two agents i and i′ in the local tree there is still always an agent j at
distances pi j = m− pˆi and pi′ j = m− pˆi′ . The lower bound can be established by repeating an argument used for exact local
trees. If the new distance between two agents i and i′ after deletion of ιι ′ had been less than min(pii′(µ),2m−2− pˆi− pˆi′) then
the following would be true. There would be multiple shortest paths of length less than or equal to m−1 between either (ι and
j) or (ι ′ and j). This would violate the property of local trees that all shortest paths of length ≤ m−1 are unique.
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Fact 2. If µ is perfectly sorted and consists of |X | components that each constitute a local tree with n/|X |
agents, then for any agent i of type x where pˆi > 0:
ui(µˆ)−ui(µ)> δ pˆi · [uι(µˆ)−uι(µ)], pˆi = min(piι(µˆ), piι ′(µˆ)). (C.14)
Proof. Inequality C.14 can be rewritten into: δ pˆi · [uι(µ)−uι(µˆ)]− [ui(µ)−ui(µˆ)] > 0. This inequality
is equivalent to the expression below (derived by substituting in Inequality C.13 for agent ι and Inequality
C.12 for agent i):
δ pˆi ·
m−1
∑
l=1
[
(κ−1)l−1 ·
(
δ l−1−δ 2m−(l+1)
)]
−
m−pˆi
∑
l=1
[
(κ−1)l−1
(
δ l−1+pˆi −δ 2m−(l−1)−pˆi
)]
> 0,
m−pˆi
∑
l=1
[
(κ−1)l−1 ·
(
δ 2m−(l+1)−pˆi −δ 2m−(l+1)+pˆi
)]
+
m−1
∑
l=m−pˆi+1
[
(κ−1)l−1
(
δ l−1+pˆi −δ 2m−(l−1)−pˆi
)]
> 0.
As it holds that 2m− (l+1)− pˆi < 2m− (l+1)+ pˆi and it holds that l−1+ pˆi < 2m− (l−1)− pˆi
(equivalent to l < m+1− pˆi) the above inequality is satisfied.
We can also derive bounds on the gains from connecting across types for local trees. We will not do
this explicitly but instead use Definition 12 on symmetric losses in local trees. This allows to express our
next result:
Fact 3. For the perfectly sorted network µ which consists of |X | network components which each constitute
a local tree of n/|X | agents that has symmetric losses then it holds that for agents i, ι of type x and pˆi > 0
ui(µ˜)−ui(µˆ)≥ δ pˆi · [uι(µ˘)−uι(µˆ)], pˆi = min(piι(µˆ), piι ′(µˆ)). (C.15)
Proof. It holds that uι(µ˜)− uι(µˆ) ≥ uι(µ˘)− uι(µˆ) as µ˜ ⊆ µ˘ (thus all shortest paths in µ˜ cannot have a
length that exceeds that in µ˘). Therefore it suffices to show:
ui(µ˜)−ui(µˆ)≥ δ pˆi · [uι(µ˜)−uι(µˆ)]. (C.16)
As the local tree has symmetric losses it follows that uι(µ˜)− uι(µˆ) = uι ′(µ˜)− uι ′(µˆ); this follows
from the fact that they both gain an equal number of new shortest paths through j, j′, this follows as as
j, j′ have same number of paths after deletion of j j′ due to symmetric losses. This entails that without
loss of generality we can assume that piι = pˆi as otherwise we could substitute ι with ι ′ and conduct the
analysis again.
For ι and some agent i′ of type x˜ it holds that pii′(µ˜)≤ pι i′(µ˜)+ pˆi. This follows as there exists a path
between i, ι and ι , i′ with respectively lengths pι i′(µ˜) and pˆi; thus pii′(µ˜)≤ pι i′(µ˜)+ pˆi. This implies the
following inequality must hold:
∑
xi′=x˜
δ pii′ (µ˜) ≥ δ pι i(µ˜) · ∑
xi′=x˜
δ pι i′ (µ˜).
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As uι(µ˜)− uι(µˆ) = ∑xi=x˜∏
pι i′ (µ˜)
l=1 δ
rl · z(x, x˜) and ui(µ˜)− ui(µˆ) = ∑xi=x˜∏
pii′ (µ˜)
l=1 δ
rl · z(x, x˜) it follows
that Inequality C.16 holds which proves our fact.
49
